ÿWPCß  Ö? äÛ> P[ñ@Ñeèº CW%Síö¬ºÊ×Üï™'8}¥…Ó«1ÿH»Z_²pk6Q#áï§ÈH#v«Òªï«‘ÈY}hÔlGb-‹k¶Y _pGµ`äµ¶ê;ÔÑîÚ´Å7 5~¾›G®½$S´ª¹ï®›ñþÛTbFíÕ<Ñ-ÌõÇî7W¿‰Miõ…;u…;>""Gä ñ6„avæê•`+d»C¨@ÜÙꘗð¸Èƒ±õ9­¼Å;TR³Õ €iŒ¢íV Ÿhz»“r9ªx|ê˜ñ¹ŽSßâpŸVâÜlò'€WŸ{Õ:|„Ê»÷@±™B«eÅ~{ÀOpíŽC\@PFSü%ãªrÄ}hˆàºËUÒ^“Â3DYŠ^¶±hq€jÈÇ[»R¼¶;æ‰2Rt¨ø².Ý®ƒ#ÿܰ¶Ý†£EŸâéôìÿJÍJklˆr[ÂÀ_3ÅΊ/`Ì˲F'O#•ÁÙÓxÑ‚êÂüâe(Ñ[T5¬Â6NQ_µù~`øëyŽÚzJ:kPÁXcàg­ƒeg@ ÑÐX&—A¬r~Þ©ØÔ•“é³úFuISDµ–Ïd pŒXŒë£”!# ÎUÝNÙ %' 0(-UšNUw@£4ã÷UBU0Hxc€ 0Dã' 0l· 0D# cg ZÊ 0D$ Zh h h h h h h h h h h h B ˜HP LaserJet IIIDHPPCL5A,È,,,,,È0 (ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡(  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular ¶Le¸U¹UºѾÁE«ÃÑÄÏÊ0†ý"@1dŠ3|xÊô\  `*Times New RomanTT*Ͼ¦ `CG Times YÝ ƒ ¯)ÝÝ  Ýò òWORKING€DRAFT€„€Ð À ÐNOT€FOR€PUBLICATIONó ó(3¯$©©Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý †Ý ƒüÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€I€would€note€that€lawyers€might€have€an€interest€in€a€strict€confidentiality€obligationÐ À Ðbecause€such€an€obligation€would€enable€the€lawyer€to€rationalize€a€self„interested€desire€not€toÏget€involved€in€an€attempt€to€rescue€the€affected€third€party.€€I€do€not€regard€this€as€a€legitimateÏself„interest.€((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó YÝ ƒ ¯)ÝÝ  Ýò òWORKING€DRAFT€„€Ð À ÐNOT€FOR€PUBLICATIONó ó PÝ ƒ¯'ÝÝ  ÝÓ  Óò òWORKING€DRAFT€„€NOT€FOR€PUBLICATIONó ó(3¯$§§Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý PÝ ƒ¯'ÝÝ  ÝÓ  Óò òWORKING€DRAFT€„€NOT€FOR€PUBLICATIONó ó dÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñÑh°ÑÑÀ°ÑÑ7€ô?XXdìdÈ7Ñà  àà ` àñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àJanuary€14,€1998Ð À ÐMemorandumÌà  àÌà  àTo:€ABA€Ethics€2000€CommissionÌà  àÌà  àFrom:€Carl€A.€Pierce,€ReporterÌà  àÌà  àRe:€Proposed€Rule€1.6€à h àÐ 4 t ÐÌà  àAttached€is€my€proposal€for€Rule€1.6€as€modified€in€response€to€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñsome€of€the€commentsñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñIÏreceivedñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€from€Geoffrey€Hazard,€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€Landau,€and€Arthur€Garwin.€€I€have€incorporated€theÏprevious€two€reports€„€respectively€dated€December€15€and€December€22€„€€into€a€singleÏdocument€and€have€highlighted€the€modifications€with€bold€print.€€Except€as€noted€in€thisÏintroductory€memorandum,€I€have€not€made€any€changes€in€the€Reporterððs€observations.€€€ÌÌà  àPer€a€suggestion€of€Geoffrey€Hazard,€I€am€proposing€the€deletion€of€my€reference€inÏparagraph€(a)€to€ð ðsimilar€matters.ðð€I€concur€with€his€suggestion€that€confidentiality€concernsÏtranscend€specific€matters€and€that€a€single€consultation€with€a€new€client€about€confidentialityÏshould€suffice.€ÌÌà  àWith€respect€to€subparagraphs€(c)(2),€(c)(3),€and€(c)(4),€Professor€Hazard€recommendsÏuse€of€a€ð ðreasonable€beliefðð€standard€rather€than€the€ð ðknowledgeðð€standard€used€in€my€proposedÏdraft.€€His€concern€is€that€many€lawyers€will€interpret€the€knowledge€standard€to€mean€that€theyÏmust€be€certain€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Because€ð ðalmost€all€lawyers€have€extreme€inhibitionsÏagainst€revealing€client€confidences,ðð€Professor€Hazard€believes€that€too€strict€a€standardÏ(knowledge€rather€than€reasonable€belief)€ð ðñ¶ñœñ¶ñmake[sñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ]€the€escape€hatch€perilous€to€useðð€and€willÏtherefore€ð ðclose€it€for€many€lawyers.ðð€€I€concur€with€Professor€Hazardððs€understanding€of€theÏsignificance€of€the€proposalððs€use€of€a€ð ðknowledgeðð€standard.€€For€purposes€of€direct€comparisonÏwith€a€ð ðreasonable€beliefðð€standard€I€would€liken€the€ð ðknowledgeðð€standard€to€a€ð ðsubstantialÏreason€to€believeðð€standard.€€I€have€added€bracketed€references€in€subparagraphs€(c)(2)€and€(c)(4)Ïto€call€the€Commissionððs€attention€to€this€issue.€€If€the€Commission€concurs€with€ProfessorÏHazard€I€would€revise€subparagraph€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñ(c)(3)ñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€to€read€€ÌÌÒ°Òò òð ð(3)€to€prevent€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€a€person€[or€aÐ ,"l! Ðclass€of€similarly€situated€persons]€if€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes,€after€reasonableÏinquiry,€that€there€is€a€significant€likelihood€that€such€injury€will€result€from€criminal€orÏfraudulent€conduct€of€the€client€[or€a€third€person].ðð€ó óÐ ð$0!$ ÐÒ°Þ ÒÒ` °Ò€€€€ò òÐ Ü%"% ÐÒ°` } Òó óà  àIn€the€context€of€disclosures€that€will€implicate€a€client€in€conduct€that€is€arguably€criminalÐ È&#& Ðor€fraudulent,€I€continue€to€prefer€a€stricter€standard€„€either€ð ðknowledgeðð€or€ð ðsubstantial€reasonÏto€believeðð€„€because€I€think€any€doubts€about€the€criminality€or€fraudulent€nature€of€the€clientððsÏconduct€ought€to€be€resolved€in€favor€of€the€client.ÌÌà  àProfessor€Hazard€has€also€noted€a€reservation€about€the€requirement€in€subparagraphÏ(d)(2)€that€the€lawyer€exhaust€the€clientððs€rights€to€appeal€an€adverse€ruling€on€the€clientððs€claimsÏof€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñprivilege.ñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€€He€thinks€the€decision€whether€to€appeal€such€rulings€should€remain€a€matter€ofÏpractical€judgment€rather€than€an€ethical€requirement.€I€have€added€brackets€around€the€pertinentÏlanguage€to€call€the€Commissionððs€attention€to€this€issue.€€The€Rule€as€currently€drafted€wouldÐ /T+/ Ðrequire€the€lawyer€to€impress€upon€the€client€the€practical€reasons€for€not€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñpursuing€an€appealñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€andÏsecure€the€clientððs€consent€to€forego€the€appeal€and€make€the€disclosures€in€question.€€DeletingÏthe€reference€to€the€appeal€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñin€subparagraph€(d)(2)€wouldñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€leave€the€issue€to€be€resolved€under€RuleÏ1.2€„€the€issue€being€whether€the€lawyer€or€the€client€has€the€authority€to€determine€whether€toÏtake€an€interlocutory€appeal€from€an€adverse€decision€rejecting€the€clientððs€invocation€of€theÏattorney„client€privilege.€€€Because€of€the€professionððs€general€policy€of€allocating€to€the€client€theÏauthority€to€make€decisions€about€the€revelation€of€confidential€information,€I€think€the€final€callÏon€whether€to€undertake€a€non„frivolous€appeal€of€an€adverse€judgment€on€a€privilege€questionÏshould€be€made€by€the€client€after€consultation€with€lawyer.€€Thus€I€prefer€the€Rule€as€currentlyÏformulated.€€I€would,€however,€address€Professor€Hazardððs€concerns€in€the€Comment.€ÌÌà  àFinally,€Professor€Hazard€has€raised€a€very€legitimate€question€about€whether€the€RuleÏitself€is€too€detailed.€€I€think€this€is€an€important€question€that€the€Commission€will€have€to€resolveÏover€and€over€again€in€the€course€of€our€review€of€the€Model€Rules.€€What€needs€to€be€addressedÏin€the€Rule€text?€€What€can€be€relegated€to€the€Comments?€€The€substance€of€Paragraphs€(a),€(e),Ïand€(f)€could€be€relegated€to€the€Comments,€but€I€thought€the€issues€were€of€sufficient€importanceÏto€be€addressed€in€the€Rule.€€I€also€struggled€to€simplify€subparagraph€(c)(5),€but€was€unable€toÏdeal€more€generally€with€the€variety€of€settings€in€which€claims€by€or€against€a€lawyer€might€be€inÏissue.€€This€clearly€merits€discussion.€€€€€ò òÐ X˜ ÐÌà  àó óYou€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñshould€haveñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€already€received€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€Landauððs€comments.€€I€have€incorporated€someÐ 0p Ðof€his€suggestions€into€the€draft.€€€I€would€also€like€to€highlight€the€following€points€made€byÏñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ:ÌÌÒ°Òà ` à1.€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñððs€concerns€about€the€application€of€paragraph€(a)€to€law€firms€andÏorganizational€clients€are€well€taken.€€I€would€like€the€Commission€to€discuss€these€issuesÏwith€an€eye€to€addressing€them€in€a€Comment.€€With€reference€to€paragraph€(b),€however,ÏI€still€think€that€the€proposed€extension€of€a€lawyerððs€confidentiality€obligations€to€includeÏinformation€related€to€the€representation€of€a€client€by€the€lawyerððs€firm€(without€regard€toÏwhether€the€lawyer€is€participating€in€the€firmððs€representation€of€the€client)€is€a€necessaryÏaddition€to€the€rule.€€ÌÌà ` à2.€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeber€has€recommended€that€paragraphñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€(b)€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñbe€modified€soñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€that€it€protects€notÏonly€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñð ðinformationñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€relating€to€the€representation€of€the€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñclientððñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€but€also€any€otherÏinformation€ð ðacquired€in€the€course€of€the€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñrepresentation€of€the€client.ððñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€€I€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñinitially€ñ¶ñmodifedñ¶ññ¶ñmodifiedñ¶ñÏparagraph€(b)€as€recommended€by€Loeber,€but€then€identified€some€drafting€problems€thatÏhave€led€me€to€leave€the€proposal€in€its€current€form.€€To€provide€a€vehicle€for€discussingÏsome€of€the€issues€raised€by€Loeberððs€recommendation,€however,€I€am€suggesting€that€theÏCommission€consider€adopting€new€paragraph€(a)€(with€subsequent€paragraphs€to€beÏrelettered€accordingly).€€The€new€paragraph€would€read€as€follows:€ÌÌÒ°…ÒÒ` °Òò òð ð(A)€A€clientððs€confidential€information€is€information€acquired€by€a€lawyer,€orÐ Œ)Ì%) Ðanother€lawyer€with€whom€the€lawyer€is€associated€in€a€firm,€that€relates€to€theÏrepresentation€of€the€client€by€the€lawyer€or€the€lawyerððs€firm€and€such€otherÏinformation€relating€to€the€client€that€is€acquired€by€the€lawyer€or€the€lawyerððs€firmÏduring€or€by€virtue€of€the€representation€of€the€client.ðð€ó óÐ <-|)- ÐÒ°` ^ÒÒ¨°Òœñ¹ñÌñ¹ñ›à ` àIf€this€new€paragraph€is€approved,€subsequent€paragraphs€would€simply€refer€toÐ /T+/ Ðthe€clientððs€confidential€information.€€This€is€the€approach€taken€by€ñ¶ñðð111ofñ¶ññ¶ñðð111€ofñ¶ñ€theÏRestatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers.€€My€proposed€definition,€however,€differsÏsubstantively€from€the€Restatement€version.€€€I€think€it€should€help€us€focus€our€discussionÏof€Loeberððs€recommendation.€ÌÌà ` à3.€With€respect€to€subparagraph€(b)(2),€Loeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€prefers€the€formulation€in€ðð113€ofÏthe€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€over€the€Model€Rule.€If€the€CommissionÏconcurs€with€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ,€subparagraph€(b)€would€be€changed€to€read€ÌÌò òÒ°>ÒÒ` °Òð ð€(2)€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€that€doing€so€will€advance€the€interests€of€theÐ  L  Ðclient€in€the€representation.ððó óÐ ø 8  ÐÒ°` ?"ÒÒݰÒÌà ` àMy€recommendation€is€that€we€use€the€Model€Rule€formulation€in€the€text€of€theÏRule€and€then€use€the€Restatement€language€as€one€example€of€a€circumstance€in€whichÏthe€lawyer€will€be€deemed€to€have€been€impliedly€authorized€to€make€a€disclosure€in€orderÏto€carry€out€the€representation€of€the€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñclient.€€ñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€€€€ÌÌà ` à3.€€I€have€bracketed€the€reference€in€paragraph€(f)€to€ð ðany€other€person€to€whomÏthe€lawyer€has€provided€such€informationðð€to€highlight€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñððs€concern€that€such€anÏextension€of€the€duty€of€care€is€too€broad€and€unworkable.€€€My€preference€would€be€toÏleave€the€reference€in€the€Rule€and€draft€a€Comment€that€explains€what€would€constituteÏreasonable€care€in€this€situation.€€At€a€minimum€reasonable€care€would€require€that€theÏlawyer€secure€an€undertaking€by€the€recipient€of€the€information€that€he€or€she€will€treatÏthe€information€as€confidential.€I€think€this€issue€merits€some€discussion.€ÌÌà ` à4.€€Agreeing€with€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€that€it€is€important€that€the€reference€to€ð ðseriousðð€beÏunderstood€as€modifying€illness,€bodily€harm€òòandóó€sexual€abuse,€I€would€prefer€to€do€this€inÐ ¸ø Ðthe€Comment€rather€than€modify€the€Rule€as€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñLoeberñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€has€suggested.€€ÌÒ°#Òò òÌ€à  àó óBecky€Stretch€has€also€forwarded€to€me€some€comments€by€Arthur€Garwin:€Ð |¼ ÐÌÒ°Òà ` à1.€With€respect€to€the€reference€to€ð ðreasonable€inquiryðð€in€the€lead„in€to€paragraphÏ(c),€subparagraph€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñ(c)(1),ñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€and€subparagraph€(d)(3),€Art€calls€attention€to€the€need€for€aÏcomment€to€make€clear€that€in€emergency€situations€it€is€reasonable€for€the€lawyer€toÏmake€a€decision€about€disclosure€without€further€inquiry.€€More€generally€I€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñthink€we€willÏneedñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€a€Comment€in€which€there€is€further€discussion€of€what€we€think€will€constitute€aÏñ¶ñœñ¶ñð ðreasonableððñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€inquiry.ÌÌà ` à2.€Per€another€suggestion€from€Art,€I€have€added€bracketed€language€to€limitÏdisclosure€in€false€imprisonment€situations€to€cases€in€which€a€person€is€falsely€imprisonedÏfor€a€felony.€€Art€also€raises€a€good€question€about€the€timing€of€such€disclosures.€€ShouldÏdisclosure€be€permitted€upon€wrongful€indictment,€wrongful€conviction,€or€only€uponÏwrongful€imprisonment€following€a€wrongful€conviction?€€The€proposal€in€its€current€formÏwas€intended€to€make€the€lawyer€wait€until€the€client€is€on€the€way€to€jail.€If€theÏCommission€is€inclined€to€permit€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñdisclosureñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€to€prevent€such€ñ¶ñœñ¶ña€miscarriageñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€of€criminalÏjustice,€I€think€we€should€explicitly€discuss€the€questions€Art€has€raised.€ÌÌà ` à3.€Art€is€also€concerned€about€the€lead„in€to€paragraph€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñ(c)ñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€that€precludes€a€lawyerÐ /X+/ Ðfrom€making€disclosures€permitted€by€paragraph€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñ(c)ñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€if€the€disclosure€is€ð ðprohibited€byÏother€law.ðð€€He€comments€that€ð ðwe€are€saying€that€the€rules€of€professional€conduct€areÏautomatically€subservient€to€every€other€law.€€This€seems€too€general.€It€may€be€that€ourÏrules€should€take€precedence€over€some€other€laws.ðð€€I€think€this€is€an€important€issue,€butÏI€am€not€quite€sure€how€to€deal€with€it€in€this€context€(as€distinct€from€the€context€inÏwhich€other€law€requires€rather€than€prohibits€disclosure).€€We€might€change€the€lead„inÏphrase€to€read€ð ðUnless€the€lawyer€knows€that€disclosure€is€prohibited€by€other€law.ðð€€ÏSuch€a€formulation€would€permit€disclosure€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñin€spite€of€other€law€ifñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€the€lawyer€couldÏfashion€a€non„frivolous€argument€that€the€other€law€in€question€was€subservient€to€theÏRules€of€Professional€Conduct.€€With€respect€to€the€more€general€issue€of€whether€theÏRules€of€Professional€Conduct€trump€other€law€or€vice€versa,€it€is€my€view€that€the€RulesÏof€Professional€Conduct€only€trump€other€law€if€the€courts€hold€that€the€rule€in€question€isÏñ¶ñœñ¶ñañ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñproper€exerciseñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€of€the€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñjudiciaryððs€inherentñ¶ñ›ñ¶ñ€and€exclusive€constitutional€authority€toÏregulate€the€judicial€branch€of€government.€€For€the€moment,€however,€I€would€simplyÏsuggest€that€the€Commission€should€identify€the€relationship€of€the€Rules€of€ProfessionalÏConduct€to€other€law€as€one€of€the€ð ðoverridingðð€issues€to€be€considered€in€ourÏdeliberations.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ñ¶ñœñ¶ñÌÒ°¹(Òò òÓ  ÓÔ‡ çŽ XXÔÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌñ¸ñÌÌÐ /X+( Ðñ¸ññºñœñÃññ¾ñÖ€ ÿÿÖñ¾ññÃññ¾ñÖ€ÿÿÖñ¾ññºññÄññºñ›ñºññÄññÄññÊñÖ€ÿÿÖñÊññÊñÖ€ÿÿÖñÊñ›ñÄñJanuary€15,€1998€Discussion€Draft€ÌPROPOSED€RULE€1.6€ÌCONFIDENTIALITY€OF€INFORMATIONÌó óÔ#†Xô?X  玫4#ÔÓŸ4ÓÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÌœÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßw<6#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôò òñÁñÓ=‡ÄÐXdÐd=ÓñÁññÂñÓ=€ô?ÐXdÐd=ÓñÂñ(a)›€Before€or€within€a€reasonable€time€after€agreeing€to€represent€a€client€in€a€matter,€a€lawyerÐ $ ° Ðwho€has€not€òòò òpreviouslyóó€ò òregularlyó óó ó€represented€the€client€ò òò òin€similar€mattersó óó ó€shall€consult€with€theÐ  œ Ðclient€about€the€lawyerððs€obligations€to€protect€information€relating€to€the€representation€and€theÏcircumstances€in€which€the€lawyer€will€be€required€or€permitted€to€reveal€or€use€such€informationÏto€the€disadvantage€of€client.€€Ìó óÔ#†Xô?XXXô?€6#ÔÌò ò(b)ó ó€ò ò(a)ó ó€A€lawyer€shall€notò ò€[knowingly][intentionally]€ó óreveal€òò€óóinformation€relating€to€ò òñ¶ñò òó óñ¶ñó ótheÐ °<  Ðrepresentation€of€a€client€ò òby€the€lawyer€or€by€a€law€firm€with€which€the€lawyer€is€associatedó ó,Ð œ(  Ðunless€ÌÒ—°ÒÌò ò(1)ó ó€the€client€consents€after€consultationò ò€òòò òwith€the€lawyeró óóóó ó€ò ò;€or€Ð `ì  ÐÒ°i:ÒÒ°ÒÌÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô(2)€ó óò òexcept€as€the€disclosures€areó ó€ò òthe€client€has€ó óimpliedly€authorized€ò òthe€lawyer€to€makeÐ <È Ðsuch€disclosure€ó óin€order€to€carry€out€the€representation€ò òof€the€client;ó ó€ò òorÐ (´ ÐÒ°þ:ÒÔ#†Xô?XXXô? ;#ÔÌÒ°Ò(3)€the€disclosure€is€for€a€proper€professional€purpose,€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€thatÏthere€is€no€significant€risk€that€the€disclosure€will€[materially]€disadvantage€the€client,€andÏthe€client€has€not€prohibited€the€lawyer€from€making€the€disclosure€in€question;€orà Ð àÐ Ød ÐÒ°L<ÒÒ°Ò(4)€ó óò òand€except€as€stated€in€paragraph€(b)ó ó€ò òthe€disclosure€is€ò òthat€areó ó€permitted€by€paragraphÐ ÄP Ð(c)€or€required€by€paragraph€(d).€ÌÌÒ°=Òó ó(c)€ò òUnless€prohibited€by€other€law,ó ó€a€lawyer€may€reveal€such€information€ò òas€permitted€by€RulesÐ ˆ Ð___,€___,€and€___€€or€if€and€when,€but€onlyó ó€to€the€extent€that,€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes,Ð t Ðò òafter€reasonable€inquiryó ó,€ò òthat€the€disclosureó ó€of€such€information€is€necessaryÐ `ì ÐÒM °Òò òÌ(1)€to€prevent€ò òó óthe€client€from€committing€a€criminal€actò òó ó€loss€of€life€or€serious€illness,€Ð 8!Ä Ðbodily€harm,€or€sexual€abuse€ó óthat€the€lawyerò ò€ó óbelievesò ò,€after€reasonable€inquiry,€ó óis€likely€toÐ $"° Ðò òresult€in€imminent€death€or€substantial€bodily€harmó óò ò€be€suffered€by€a€person;€or€Ð #œ ÐÌ(2)€to€prevent€or€rectify€what€the€lawyer€knows€ò ò[has€reason€to€believe]ó ó€to€be€theÐ è$t! Ðwrongful€imprisonment€of€a€person€ò ò[for€a€felony]ó ó;€orÐ Ø%d " Ðó óÌÒ°È?ÒÒ°Òò ò(3)€to€prevent€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€a€person€[or€a€classÐ ´'@"$ Ðof€similarly€situated€persons]€if€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes,€after€reasonable€inquiry,Ïthat€there€is€a€significant€likelihood€that€such€injury€will€result€from€ÌÌÒ°BÒÒ` °Ò(i)€future€conduct€of€the€client€[or€a€third€person]€that€the€lawyer€knows€òòò òisóó€ò òwill€beó óó óÐ d+ð%( Ðcriminal€or€fraudulent;€or€€ÌÌÒ°` YCÒÒ` °Ò(ii)€past€conduct€of€the€client€[or€a€third€person]€that€the€lawyer€knowsò ò€òòisóó€ò òto€beó óó óÐ ,.¸(+ Ðcriminal€or€fraudulent;€or€€€€Ð /¨), ЇÒ°` DÒÒk°Ò(4)€to€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ôrectify€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?ùD#Ôor€mitigate€substantial€injury€toó ó€ò òthe€financial€or€property€interests€of€a€personÐ t Ðthat€the€lawyer€knows€ò ò[has€reason€to€believe]ó ó€has€been€caused€by€the€criminal€orÐ `ì Ðfraudulent€conduct€of€the€client€in€a€matter€in€whichò ò€[ó óthe€lawyer€is€representing€or€hasÐ PÜ Ðrepresented€the€clientò ò]€[the€lawyerððs€services€have€been€or€are€being€utilized€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ôby€theÐ @Ì Ðclient]ó ó;€orÔ#†Xô?XXXô?âF#ÔÐ 0 ¼ ÐòòÌÌÒ°àDÒóóÒ°ÒÒ°Ò(5)€ó óò ò(B)(2)ó ó€to€establishÐ 8 Ä ÐÌÒ°|GÒÒ°ŠGÒÒ` °Òò ò(i)ó ó€€a€ò òreasonableó ó€claim€or€defense€on€behalf€of€the€lawyer,€ò òor€the€lawyerððs€firmó ó,€in€aÐ  œ  Ðcontroversy€between€the€lawyer€and€the€clientò ò;€oró ó€Ð ü ˆ  ÐÌò ò(ii)ó ó€€a€ò òreasonableó ó€defense€to€a€ò òformally€institutedó ó€criminal€charge€or€civil€claimÐ Ô`  Ðagainst€the€lawyerò ò,€or€another€person€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ôparticipating€in€the€representation€of€theÐ ÀL  ÐclientÔ#†Xô?XXXô?pI#Ô,€ó óthat€is€based€upon€conduct€in€which€the€client€was€involvedò òÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô;€orÐ ¬8  ÐÌ(iii)ó óÔ#†Xô?XXXô?:J#Ô€a€ò òreasonableÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€defense€to€a€complaint€against€the€lawyer,€or€another€lawyerÐ „ Ðparticipating€in€the€representation€of€the€client,€that€is€submitted€to€or€instituted€byÏa€disciplinary€authority€and€relates€to€the€representation€of€the€client;ó óÔ#†Xô?XXXô?®J#Ô€or€Ð \è ÐÌò ò(iv)ó ó€€a€ò òreasonableó ó€response€to€ò òa€specificó ó€allegationò ò€that€is€made€against€the€lawyer,Ð 4À Ðor€another€person€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ôparticipating€in€the€representation€of€the€clientÔ#†Xô?XXXô?’L#Ô,€ó óin€any€otherÐ  ¬ Ðproceedingò ò€and€relates€toó ó€ò òconcerningó ó€the€ò òlawyer'só ó€representation€of€the€client.ò òÐ  ˜ ÐÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?¤M#ÔÒ°` òGÒÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô(d)€A€lawyer€shall€reveal€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€to€the€extent€theÐ äp Ðlawyer€reasonably€believes€disclosure€is€necessary:ÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?ùM#ÔÒ°ÒÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?ôN#Ô(1)€to€comply€with€Rules€___,€___€,€___,€___,€___....;€€and€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ ¨4 ÐÌ(2)€to€comply€with€an€order€of€a€tribunal,€administrative€agency€or€a€legislative€bodyÏrequiring€disclosure€but€onlyò ò€ò òifó ó€òòto€the€extentó óóó€finally€ordered€to€do€so€by€the€tribunal,Ð l ø Ðagency€or€body€after€the€lawyer€has€asserted€on€behalf€of€the€client€all€non„frivolous€claimsÏthat€the€information€sought€by€the€tribunal€or€agency€is€protected€against€disclosure€by€theÏattorney„client€privilege€or€other€applicable€law€[and€has€exhausted€the€clientððs€rights€toÏappeal€adverse€rulings€on€the€clientððs€claims];€and€ÌÌ(3)€to€comply€with€other€law,€provided,€however,€that€a€lawyer€may€refrain€from€makingÏsuch€disclosure€if€the€lawyer€has€a€non„frivolous€reason€to€believe€ò òò ò[reasonably€believes]ó óó ó,Ð ä&p!% Ðafter€reasonable€inquiry,€that€the€law€in€question€does€not€legally€obligate€the€lawyer€toÏmake€the€disclosure€in€question;€andÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?sO#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?FS#ÔÒ°æNÒÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô(e)€Prior€to€disclosing€such€information€as€permitted€by€paragraph€(c),€or€as€required€by€paragraphÐ ˜*$%) Ð(d),€a€lawyer€shall,€if€reasonably€feasible,€ÌÌÒ°Ò(1)€advise€the€client€to€take€such€action,€or€refrain€from€taking€such€action,€as€the€lawyerÏreasonably€believes€is€necessary€to€accomplish€the€purpose€for€which€the€lawyer€wouldÏotherwise€be€permitted€to€disclose€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€the€client;Ð 4/À). ÐandÌÌ(2)€consult€with€the€client€about€the€consequences€of€the€clientððs€failure€to€do€so,€includingÏwhether€and€to€what€extent€the€lawyer€is€required€or€permitted€by€these€Rules€to€discloseÏor€use€information€relating€to€the€representation€to€prevent€or€rectify€the€harmfulÏconsequences€of€the€act;€and€€€€ÌÌ(3)€provide€the€client€with€reasonable€advance€notice€of€the€lawyerððs€determination€toÏmake€the€disclosure€in€question.€ÌÒ°aTÒÔ#†Xô?XXXô?›S#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôó ó€€ò òÐ À L  Ð(f)€A€lawyer€shall€act€with€reasonable€care€to€safeguard€information€relating€to€the€representationÏof€a€client€against€inadvertent€or€unauthorized€disclosure€by€the€lawyer,€by€other€persons€who€areÏparticipating€in€the€representation€of€the€client€and€who€are€subject€to€the€lawyerððs€supervision,ò òÐ „  Ð[or€by€any€other€person€to€whom€the€lawyer€has€provided€such€information.]ó óó ó€ò òÔ#†Xô?XXXô?{W#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ pü  Мñºñœñºñó óÔ#†Xô?XXXô?rY#ÔñÁñÓA†XÐXdÐXd@6AÓñÁñÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô›à  àÔ#†Xô?XXXô?#Z#ԀР`ì  ÐÓ  Óò òÔ‡î‹îXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?Xîî‹—Z#ÔÔ‡ çŽ XXô?ÔReporterððs€Observations€Ô#†Xô?X  çŽÚZ#Ôó óÐ lø ÐÓˆZÓÌÓ  Óò òÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔIntroductionó ó€Ô#†Xô?X¼¼ßwo[#ÔÐ Œ ÐÓ`[ÓÌà  àOnly€Alabama,€Delaware,€Louisiana,€Missouri,€Montana,€and€Rhode€Island€have€adoptedÏABA€Model€Rule€1.6€without€any€modification.€€There€is€considerable€variation€among€the€states,Ïand€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€differs€significantly€from€the€ModelÏRule.€€ÌÌà  àThis€draft€is€premised€on€the€assumption€that€the€prohibition€against€use€of€informationÏrelating€to€the€clientððs€representation€to€the€disadvantage€of€the€client€(and€any€new€rulesÏgoverning€use€of€such€information€to€the€advantage€of€the€lawyer€or€a€third€person)€will€beÏlocated€in€Rule€1.8(b),€that€any€confidentiality€duties€to€prospective€clients€will€be€contained€in€aÏnew€Rule€1.0€that€will€address€all€duties€a€lawyer€owes€to€prospective€clients,€and€that€theÏlawyerððs€confidentiality€obligations€to€former€clients€will€be€set€forth€in€Rule€1.9(c).€€€Also,€€as€willÏbe€€reflected€in€specific€cross„€references€to€other€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct€in€paragraphs€(c)Ïand€(d),€I€also€envision€that€confidentiality€obligations€will€be€addressed€in€Rule€3.3€(disclosuresÏnecessary€to€prevent€or€rectify€criminal€offenses€against€the€administration€of€justice),€a€newÏparagraph€in€Rule€3.4€(dealing€with€tangible€evidence€that€comes€into€the€possession€of€a€lawyerÏwho€is€representing€a€client€in€a€criminal€matter),€Rule€3.9€(candor€in€non„adjudicativeÏproceedings),€Rule€4.1€(truthfulness€in€statements€to€others),€a€new€paragraph€in€Rule€4.4Ï(addressing€the€responsibilities€of€lawyers€who€receive€misdirected€or€wrongfully€directedÏprivileged€communications),€€Rule€8.1(candor€in€bar€admission€and€disciplinary€proceedings)€andÏRule€8.3€(reporting€lawyer€misconduct).€€I€also€have€in€mind€a€new€Rule€2.5€that€will€set€forth€theÏrights€and€responsibilities€of€lawyers€who€are€serving€as€ð ðmentorsðð€for€lawyers€with€whom€theyÏare€not€associated€in€a€firm,€a€new€Rule€4.5€that€will€address€the€confidentiality€obligations€ofÏlawyers€to€third€persons€who€confide€information€to€a€lawyer€in€what€ðð126€of€the€Restatement€ofÏthe€Law€Governing€Lawyers€refers€to€as€a€ð ðCommon„Interest€Arrangement,ðð€and€a€yetÏunnumbered€new€Rule€that€would€address€the€obligations€of€lawyers€who€are€representing€clientsÐ °.<), Ðin€their€capacity€as€trustees,€guardians,€executors€and€other€similar€fiduciary€relationships.€€€ò òÐ t Ðó óÒ°ÒÌÒ°*eÒà  àThe€Observations€that€follow€are€organized€by€reference€to€the€various€Paragraphs€andÏSubparagraphs€in€the€Proposed€Rule.€€ÌÓ  Óò òÌÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔI.€€Paragraph€(a)Ð  œ ÐÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwãe#ÔÓÓeÓÒܰÒÒܰÒÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôò òÌó ó(a)€Before€or€within€a€reasonable€time€after€agreeing€to€represent€a€client€in€a€matter,€aÐ  œ Ðlawyer€who€has€not€òòò òpreviouslyóó€ò òregularlyó óó ó€represented€the€client€ò òò òin€similar€mattersó óó ó€shallÐ ü ˆ Ðconsult€with€the€client€about€the€lawyerððs€obligations€to€protect€information€relating€to€theÏrepresentation€and€the€circumstances€in€which€the€lawyer€will€be€required€or€permitted€toÏreveal€or€use€such€information€to€the€disadvantage€of€client.€€ÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?wf#ÔÒ°Ü[fÒÒ°ÜifÒó óÌà  àI€am€not€aware€of€any€jurisdiction€that€has€adopted€such€a€provision.€The€idea€for€such€aÏrequirement€comes€from€Pizzamente,€ð ðThe€Lawyerððs€Duty€To€Warn€Clients€About€The€Limits€OfÏConfidentiality,ðð€39€Catholic€U.L.€Rev.441€(1990).€€The€authorððs€conclusion€is€that€a€failure€to€soÏwarn€or€consult€with€a€client€about€limitations€would€be€unethical€and€constitute€actionableÏmalpractice.€€I€agree.€€Such€consultation€may€already€be€required€by€Rule€1.4.Ìà  à¹Ó  Óò òÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÌII.€Paragraph€(b)Ô#†Xô?X¼¼ßwÔj#Ôó óÐ 8Ä ÐÓÅjÓÌÒܰÒÒܰÒò ò(b)ó ó€ò ò(a)ó ó€A€lawyer€shall€notò ò€[knowingly][intentionally]€ó óreveal€òò€óóinformation€relating€to€œò òñ¹ñòòóóñ¹ñó óthe›Ð 8Ä Ðrepresentation€of€a€client€ò òby€the€lawyer€or€by€a€law€firm€with€which€the€lawyer€isÐ $° Ðassociatedó ó,€unless€Ð œ ÐÒ°ÜQkÒÒ—°ÒÌò ò(1)ó ó€the€client€consents€after€consultationò ò€òòò òwith€the€lawyeró óóóó ó€ò ò;€or€Ð èt ÐÒ°²lÒÒ°ÒÌÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô(2)€ó óò òexcept€as€the€disclosures€areó ó€ò òthe€client€has€ó óimpliedly€authorized€ò òthe€lawyer€to€makeÐ ÄP Ðsuch€disclosure€ó óin€order€to€carry€out€the€representation€ò òof€the€client;ó ó€ò òorÐ ° < ÐÒ°GmÒÔ#†Xô?XXXô?Vm#ÔÌÒ°Ò(3)€the€disclosure€is€for€a€proper€professional€purpose,€the€lawyer€reasonably€believesÏthat€there€is€no€significant€risk€that€the€disclosure€will€[materially]€disadvantage€theÏclient,€and€the€client€has€not€prohibited€the€lawyer€from€making€the€disclosure€inÏquestion;€orà ¸ àÐ L%Ø" ÐÒ°•nÒÒ°ÒÌ(4)€ó óò òand€except€as€stated€in€paragraph€(b)ó ó€ò òthe€disclosure€is€ò òthat€areó ó€permitted€byÐ $'°!$ Ðparagraph€(c)€or€required€by€paragraph€(d).€ÌÒ°æoÒÌÒ°Ü_kÒó óÌà  àExcept€for€the€highlighted€language,€I€am€recommending€retention€of€the€substance€ofÏModel€Rule€1.6(a).€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òA.€ó ó€ð ðòò€óóinformation€relating€to€œò òñ¹ñòòóóñ¹ñó óthe›€representation€of€a€clientò òðð€ó óÐ ˜-$(+ ÐÓ:qÓÌà  àThe€core€of€proposed€paragraph€1.6(a)€is€its€prohibition€against€disclosure€of€ð ðinformationÐ t/*- Ðrelating€to€the€representation€of€a€client.ðð€€This€language€is€taken€from€the€current€Model€RuleÏand€is€currently€used€in€33€jurisdictions.€€œ€Loeber€Landau€has€recommended€that€paragraph€(b)€beÏmodified€so€that€it€protects€not€only€ð ðinformation€relating€to€the€representation€of€the€clientðð€butÏalso€any€other€information€ð ðacquired€in€the€course€of€the€representation€of€the€client.ðð€€I€initiallyÏmodified€paragraph€(b)€as€recommended€by€Loeber,€but€then€identified€some€drafting€problemsÏthat€have€led€me€to€leave€the€proposal€in€its€current€form.€€To€provide€a€vehicle€for€discussingÏsome€of€the€issues€raised€by€Loeberððs€recommendation,€however,€I€am€suggesting€that€theÏCommission€consider€adopting€new€paragraph€(a)€(with€subsequent€paragraphs€to€be€reletteredÏaccordingly).€€The€new€paragraph€would€read€as€follows:€ÌÌÒ` °Òò òð ð(a)€A€clientððs€confidential€information€is€information€acquired€by€a€lawyer,€orÐ ¬8  Ðanother€lawyer€with€whom€the€lawyer€is€associated€in€a€firm,€that€relates€to€theÏrepresentation€of€the€client€by€the€lawyer€or€the€lawyerððs€firm€and€such€otherÏinformation€relating€to€the€client€that€is€acquired€by€the€lawyer€or€the€lawyerððs€firmÏduring€or€by€virtue€of€the€representation€of€the€client.ðð€ÌÒ°` ¤uÒó óÌAlternative€formulations€the€Commission€may€wish€to€consider€include:€Ìà  àÌÒ°Ò1.€The€formulation€in€the€ABA€Model€Code:€ð ðconfidencesðð€(information€protected€by€theÏattorney€client„privilege€under€applicable€law)€and€ð ðsecretsðð€(other€information€gained€inÏthe€professional€relationship€that€the€client€has€requested€be€held€inviolate€or€theÏdisclosure€of€which€would€be€embarrassing€or€would€be€likely€to€be€detrimental€to€theÏclients).€€This€formulation€is€used€in€D.C.,€Georgia,€Illinois,€Iowa,€Maine,€Minnesota,€ÏMichigan,€Nebraska,€New€York,€Ohio,€Oregon,€Tennessee,€Texas,€Virginia,€and€Vermont.€Ï€Massachusetts€uses€the€Model€Code€formulation€of€ð ðinformation€gained€in€theÏprofessional€relationship,ðð€but€drops€the€requirement€that€the€client€request€theÏinformation€be€held€inviolate€or€that€it€be€embarrassing€or€detrimental€to€the€client.€ÌÌ2.€ðð€111,€ALI,€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers:€ð ðconfidential€clientÏinformationðð€defined€in€pertinent€part€as€ð ðinformation€relating€to€that€client,€acquired€by€aÏlawyer€or€an€agent€of€the€lawyer€in€the€course€of€or€as€a€result€of€representing€the€clientÏ...ðð€€ÌÌ3.€The€American€Lawyerððs€Code€of€Conduct:€ð ða€clientððs€confidenceðð€defined€as€ð ðanyÌinformation€obtained€by€the€clientððs€lawyer€in€the€course€of€and€by€reason€of€the€lawyer„¼client€relationship.ðð€ÌÌ4.€Mississippi:€ð ðinformation€which€is€confidential€or€privileged€by€law€or€relating€to€theÏrepresentation€of€a€client€which€a€lawyer€has€reason€to€believe€may€be€detrimental€to€theÏclient€or€which€client€has€requested€not€be€disclosed.ðð€Ìà ` àà ¸ àÌ5.€Texas:€ð ðconfidential€informationðð€includes€ð ðprivilegedðð€and€ð ðunprivilegedðð€clientÏinformation.€ð ðUnprivileged€information€includes€all€information€relating€to€the€client€orÏfurnished€by€the€client€...€€or€acquired€by€the€lawyer€during€the€course€of€or€by€reason€ofÏthe€representation€of€the€client.ðð€€Ì€Ð ð.|)- Ð6.€Massachusetts:€ð ð€A€lawyer€shall€not€reveal€òòconfidentialóó€information€relating€to€theÐ t Ðrepresentation€of€a€client€...ðð€(emphasis€added).€€There€is€then€a€lengthy€discussion€of€theÏsignificance€of€limiting€the€scope€of€the€ruleððs€protection€to€ð ðconfidentialðð€information.€€Ì€ÌÒ°ÅwÒà  àI€would€retain€the€Model€Rule€formulation€because€it€affords€protection€to€all€informationÏthat€relates€to€the€lawyerððs€representation€without€need€for€argumentation€over€when€theÏrepresentation€commenced€or€ended€or€whether€the€information€came€to€the€lawyer€because€or€byÏvirtue€of€the€representation.€€The€only€variables€in€the€Model€Rule€formulation€are€the€scope€ofÏthe€lawyerððs€representation€and€whether€the€information€is€relevant€to€that€representation.€€I€amÏamenable€to€broadening€the€scope€of€Rule€1.6€so€that€it€will€also€protect€information€about€theÏclient€that€is€acquired€by€the€lawyer€either€during€or€by€virtue€of€the€lawyerððs€representation€of€theÏclient.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓB.ò ò€ð ð[Knowingly]€[Intentionally]ððó óÐ pü  ÐÓUƒÓÌà  àAlthough€only€five€jurisdictions€(DC,€Illinois,€Maine,€Michigan,€Minnesota€and€Texas)Ïcurrently€do€so,€the€Commission€should€entertain€the€possibility€of€limiting€the€prohibition€in€RuleÏ1.6(a)€so€that€a€lawyer€will€violate€Rule€1.6(a)€only€if€the€lawyer€ð ðknowinglyðð€disclosesÏinformation€relating€to€the€representation.€€My€thought€is€that€it€would€be€useful€for€disciplinary€Ïpurposes€to€have€two€distinct€duties€„€the€duty€in€Rule€1.6(a)€not€to€ð ðknowinglyðð€orÏð ðintentionallyððdisclose€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€and€a€separate€duty€toÏexercise€reasonable€care€to€safeguard€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€againstÏinadvertent€disclsosure€by€the€lawyer€or€inadvertent€or€unauthorized€disclosure€by€other€personsÏfor€whose€conduct€the€lawyer€should€be€responsible.€€This€latter€duty€is€set€forth€in€paragraph€(f).€ÏFor€purposes€of€determining€sanctions,€this€formulation€would€permit€a€disciplinary€authority€toÏdifferentiate€between€intentional€and€negligent€disclosure€of€protected€information€and€treat€theÏformer€as€a€more€serious€offense.€€I€like€the€idea€of€differentiating€between€intentional€andÏnegligent€misconduct,€but€am€cognizant€of€the€fact€that€only€a€handful€of€jurisdictions€have€doneÏso.€€Although€ð ðknowinglyðð€is€the€formulation€currently€in€use,€I€added€the€bracketed€reference€toÏð ðintentionalðð€because€lawyers€tend€to€think€in€terms€of€the€distinction€between€intentional€andÏnegligent€conduct€and€that€such€terminology€better€communicates€what€I€hope€to€accomplish€byÏlimiting€paragraph€(a)€and€adding€paragraph€(f).€Ì€€€€€ÌÓ  ÓC.€ò òð ðby€the€lawyer€or€by€a€law€firm€with€which€the€lawyer€is€associatedððó óÐ à#l! ÐÓŠÓÌà  àThis€proposed€reference€to€the€lawyerððs€firm€is€needed€to€make€it€clear€that€a€lawyerððsÏconfidentiality€obligations€are€vicariously€extended€to€all€lawyers€with€whom€the€lawyer€isÏassociated€in€a€firm€and€to€provide€a€point€of€reference€in€the€Rule€for€a€paragraph€in€theÏComment€that€will€discuss€the€confidentiality€obligations€of€lawyers€who€are€of€counsel€to€a€firm,Ïwho€are€temporarily€employed€by€a€firm,€who€are€associated€with€a€firm€that€is€affiliated€withÏanother€firm,€or€who€are€participating€in€what€€ðð126€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€LawÏGoverning€Lawyers€refers€to€as€a€ð ðCommon„Interest€Arrangement.ðð€€As€it€relates€to€temporaryÏlawyers,€this€issue€was€addressed€in€ABA€Formal€Ethics€Opinion€88„356€in€which€the€EthicsÏCommittee€generally€held€that€a€lawyer€who€was€associated€with€a€firm€was€obligated€to€preserveÏconfidentiality€of€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€any€client€of€the€firm€without€regardÏto€whether€the€lawyer€was€participating€in€the€clientððs€representation€or€how€the€lawyer€acquiredÐ ð.|)- Ðthe€information.€€With€respect€to€a€temporary€lawyer€only€involved€in€a€limited€number€of€discreteÏcases€for€a€limited€period€so€of€time,€however,€the€Committee€held€that€the€temporary€lawyerððsÏconfidentiality€obligation€is€limited€to€information€relating€to€cases€on€which€he€or€she€is€workingÏor€has€worked€(regardless€of€source)€and€to€information€about€other€clients€of€the€firm€the€lawyerÏmay€have€acquired€by€virtue€of€the€temporary€association€with€the€firm.€€ÌÌà  àAlthough€these€issues€could€be€discussed€in€the€Comment€in€terms€of€situations€ð ðin€whichÏa€lawyer€will€be€deemed€to€be€representing€a€client,ðð€I€think€it€better€to€think€of€individual€lawyersÏas€representing€clients€only€if€they€participate€in€the€representation€and€to€expand€theÏconfidentiality€obligation€of€a€lawyer€to€include€information€related€to€the€representation€of€clientsÏbeing€represented€by€the€lawyerððs€firm,€but€in€whose€representation€the€lawyer€is€not€participating.€ÌÌÓ  ÓD.€Subparagraph€(b)(1)ÌÌð ðthe€client€consents€after€consultationðð€Ì€ÌÓ«’Óà  àThis€is€the€Model€Rule€formulation€which€is€employed€in€33€jurisdictions.€€Consultation€isÏdefined€as€denoting€ð ðcommunication€of€information€reasonably€sufficient€to€permit€the€client€toÏappreciate€the€significance€of€the€matter€in€question.ðð€€The€ABA€Model€Code€of€ProfessionalÏResponsibility€refers€to€client€consent€ð ðafter€full€disclosure.ðð€My€best€estimate€is€that€thisÏformulation€is€used€in€12€jurisdictions.€ðð114€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÏLawyers€provides€that€ð ða€lawyer€may€use€or€disclose€confidential€client€information€when€theÏclient€consents€òòafter€being€adequately€informed€concerning€the€use€or€disclosureóó.ðð€(EmphasisÐ ¼H Ðadded).€€Professor€Mooreððs€proposal€for€Rule€1.7€refers€to€client€consent€to€the€representationÏð ðafter€òòreceiving€reasonably€adequate€informationóó€about€the€material€risks€of€the€representation.ððÐ ”  Ð(Emphasis€added).€€I€prefer€the€Model€Rule€formulation€because€of€its€conciseness€and€generality.€ÏI€also€think€ð ðconsultationðð€is€preferable€to€ð ðdisclosureðð€because€consultation€implies€explanationÏas€well€as€the€provision€of€information.€I€also€think€that€it€is€important€that€the€Rule€€clearlyÏindicate€that€the€lawyer€who€is€seeking€the€clientððs€consent€must€take€the€initiative€and€provide€theÏclient€with€the€necessary€information.€€I€would,€therefore,€recommend€that€the€Commission€useÏthe€current€Model€Rule€formulation€requiring€client€consent€ð ðafter€consultationðð€but€I€also€wouldÏrecommend€a€slight€modification€of€the€definition€of€consultation€so€it€would€readÏð ðcommunication€of€information€by€the€lawyer€to€the€client€that€is€reasonably€sufficient€to€permitÏthe€client€to€appreciate€the€significance€of€the€matter€in€question.ðð€€€€€€€€ÌÒF¿°ÒÌÓ  ÓÒ°'šÒE.€Subparagraph€(b)(2)€ÌÓ:šÓÒܰÒÒܰÒò òÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÓ  ÓÌ(2)€ó óò òexcept€as€the€disclosures€areó ó€ò òthe€client€has€ó óimpliedly€authorized€ò òthe€lawyer€to€make€suchÐ '"% Ðdisclosure€ó óin€order€to€carry€out€the€representation€ò òof€the€client;ó ó€ò òorÐ |(#& ÐÒ°Ü€šÒÒ°ÜŽšÒÔ#†Xô?XXXô?Ÿš#ÔÓ¾šÓÓfÓà @ àó óÌÓ œÓÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôà  àSubparagraph€(b)(2)€is€a€slight€rewording€of€the€current€rulesððs€reference€to€ð ðdisclosuresÐ T*à$( Ðimpliedly€authorized€in€order€to€carry€out€the€representation.ððÔ#†Xô?XXXô?<œ#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€€32€jurisdictions€have€adopted€theÐ @+Ì%) ÐModel€Rule€formulation.€€Illinois,€Maine,€Michigan,€Minnesota,€Mississippi€and€the€Model€CodeÏjurisdictions€make€no€reference€to€ð ðimpliedly€authorizedðð€disclosures.€€DC€requires€the€lawyerÏhave€ð ðreasonable€grounds€for€believing€that€the€client€has€impliedly€authorized€disclosure.€€FloridaÏpermits€disclosure€ð ðto€serve€the€clientððs€interests€unless€it€is€information€the€client€specificallyÐ ð.|)- Ðrequires€not€to€be€disclosed.ððÔ#†Xô?XXXô?A#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€Texas€interestingly€differentiates€between€privileged€andÐ t Ðunprivileged€client€information€and€limits€the€exception€for€impliedly€authorized€disclosures€toÏunprivileged€client€information.€€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?†Ÿ#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ LØ ÐÌà  àðð113€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€does€not€include€a€referenceÏto€ð ðimplied€authorizationðð€but€more€directly€provides€that€ð ða€lawyer€may€use€or€discloseÏconfidential€information€when€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€that€doing€so€will€advance€theÏinterests€of€the€client€in€the€representation.ðð€€ÌÌà  àI€see€no€need€to€depart€from€the€Model€Rule.€€I€will€be€proposing€a€Comment€that€makesÏit€clear€that€client€instructions€to€the€contrary€trump€the€lawyerððs€discretion€in€this€regard.€TheÏComment€will€in€effect€incorporate€the€substance€of€Floridaððs€rule€that€permits€disclosure€ð ðtoÏserve€the€clientððs€interests€unless€it€is€information€the€client€specifically€requires€not€to€beÏdisclosed.ðð€€I€will€also€be€adding€to€the€Comment€a€statement€to€the€effect€that€a€lawyer€will€notÏbe€deemed€ð ðimpliedly€authorizedðð€to€reveal€or€use€information€in€situations€in€which€a€reasonableÏlawyer€would€conclude€that€there€is€a€significant€risk€that€the€disclosure€or€use€would€beÏmaterially€disadvantageous€to€the€client.€This€would€be€true€even€though€the€disclosure€might€beÏdeemed€necessary€to€carry€out€the€representation.€€I€think€client€consent€ought€to€be€obtained€inÏsuch€circumstances.€€€ÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?š #ÔÌÓ  ÓF.€Subparagraph€(b)(3)€€ÌÓâ¥ÓÒܰÒÒܰÒò òÓ  ÓÌ(4)€the€disclosure€is€for€a€proper€professional€purpose,€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€thatÏthere€is€no€[significant]€risk€that€the€disclosure€will€[materially]€disadvantage€the€client,ó ó€ò òandÐ ¨4 Ðthe€client€has€not€instructed€the€lawyer€that€the€lawyer€is€not€to€make€the€disclosure€inÏquestion;€orò òÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ôó óÐ €  ÐÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“…§#ÔҰܦÒÒ°Ü%¦ÒÓ6¦ÓÓzÓ€ó óÐ lø ÐÓ¨Ó€à  àThere€is€no€counterpart€to€this€subparagraph€in€Model€1.6.€€34€jurisdictions€have€adoptedÐ Xä Ðthe€Model€Rule€approach€in€which€the€Rule€does€not€on€its€face€appear€to€permit€any€disclosureÏabsent€consent€or€an€implied€authorization€to€carry€out€the€representation€or€as€otherwiseÏpermitted€or€required€by€the€rule.€€Under€the€ABA€Model€Code€of€Professional€ResponsibilityÏthere€is€no€such€limitation€to€the€lawyerððs€duty€not€to€reveal€ð ðconfidencesðð€(information€protectedÏby€the€attorney„client€privilege),€but€information€will€only€be€protected€as€a€ð ðsecretðð€if€theÏdisclosure€ð ðwould€be€embarrassing€or€would€be€likely€to€be€detrimental€to€the€clientðð€or€the€clientÏhad€instructed€the€lawyer€not€to€make€the€disclosure€in€question.€€15€jurisdictions€utilize€the€ABAÏModel€Code€approach.ÌÌà  àðð112€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€only€prohibits€the€use€orÏdisclosure€of€confidential€client€information€ð ðif€there€is€a€reasonable€prospect€that€doing€so€willÏadversely€affect€a€material€interest€of€the€client€or€if€the€client€has€instructed€the€lawyer€not€to€...Ïdisclose€such€information.ðð€€Note€that€the€Restatement€exception€to€the€lawyerððs€confidentialityÏobligation€is€broader€than€that€contained€in€the€ABA€Model€Code.€€This€is€because€theÏRestatement€would€permit€disclosure€of€information€protected€by€the€attorney„client€privilege€soÏlong€as€the€disclosure€would€not€present€a€reasonable€prospect€of€a€material€adverse€affect€on€theÏclient.€€The€ABA€Model€Code€does€not€so€permit€a€ð ðharmlessðð€disclosure€of€a€client€ð ðconfidence.ððÌÐ ð.|)- Ðà  àAlthough€initially€disinclined€to€recommend€adoption€of€either€the€ALI€or€the€ABA€ModelÏCode€approach,€I€am€now€recommending€adoption€of€a€modified€version€of€the€RestatementÏapproach.€€The€primary€substantive€modification€is€the€addition€of€a€requirement€that€theÏdisclosure€be€for€a€proper€professional€purpose.€€Idle€gossip€about€client€matters€should€not€beÏpermitted€even€if€there€is€no€prospect€of€harm€to€the€client.€€I€have€also€restructured€the€ALIÏformulation€to€make€it€even€more€clear€that€the€lawyerððs€judgments€about€the€risk€and€magnitudeÏof€an€adverse€affect€must€be€reasonable.€€Finally€by€the€bracketed€inclusion€of€ð ðsignificantðð€toÏmodify€ð ðriskðð€and€ððððmateriallyðð€to€modify€ð ðdisadvantage,€I€am€raising€for€the€CommissionððsÏconsideration€the€question€of€how€broad€this€limitation€of€the€lawyerððs€confidentiality€obligationÏshould€be.€€€The€version€of€the€proposal€that€would€provide€the€client€with€the€most€protectionÏwould€be€one€in€which€the€lawyer€would€be€required€to€reasonably€believe€that€there€is€no€risk€ofÏany€disadvantage.€€The€version€that€would€permit€the€lawyer€the€greatest€freedom€to€reveal€clientÏinformation€for€proper€professional€purposes€would€be€one€that€permitted€disclosure€withoutÏclient€consent€so€long€as€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€that€there€is€no€significant€risk€that€theÏclient€will€be€materially€disadvantaged.€€ÌÌà  àI€think€that€there€is€a€need€for€a€provision€like€this€in€the€text€of€the€Rule€to€which€one€canÏrefer€in€a€Comment€that€explains,€for€example,€that€a€lawyer€is€permitted€to€reveal€informationÏrelated€to€the€representation€of€the€client€to€the€extent€reasonably€necessary€to€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ôð ðsecure€legalÐ  ˜ Ðadvice€from€another€lawyer€about€the€lawyerððs€compliance€with€the€rules€of€Professional€ConductÏor€other€law€in€connection€with€the€representation€of€the€client.ðð€This€might€not€be€a€disclosureÏthat€is€ð ðimpliedly€authorized€to€carry€out€the€representationðð€because€the€lawyer€may€be€seekingÏadvice€about€whether€the€lawyer€is€required€to€do€something€the€client€has€instructed€the€lawyerÏnot€to€do.€€Because€the€consultation€with€the€lawyer€would€be€privileged€and€the€lawyer€who€wasÏconsulted€would€also€have€to€comply€with€Rule€1.6,€there€would€be€slight,€if€any,€disadvantage€toÏthe€client.€€There€is€no€language€in€the€current€formulation€of€€Rule€1.6€to€which€one€can€refer€toÏjustify€a€lawyer€disclosing€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€for€this€veryÏlegitimate€professional€purpose.€€ÌÌò òà  àó óAnother€example€of€the€need€for€a€ð ðharmlessðð€limitation€would€relate€to€the€need€for€aÐ 0 ¼ Ðlawyer€who€is€changing€jobs€to€alert€the€prospective€employer€to€any€conflicts€between€theÏprospective€employerððs€clients€and€what€will€soon€be€or€are€the€lawyers€former€clients.€€To€do€thisÏthe€lawyer€must€inform€the€prospective€employer€of€the€identity€and€general€subject€matter€of€theÏrepresentation.€€The€problem€is€that€this€information€is€information€related€to€the€representation€ofÏthe€lawyerððs€clients€and€the€disclosure€is€not€being€made€to€carry€out€the€representation€of€theÏlawyerððs€clients.€The€information€is€being€disclosed€for€the€protection€of€the€new€firm€and€itsÏclients.€In€most€cases,€however,€disclosure€of€such€limited€information€will€not€present€any€risk€ofÏharm€to€the€clients,€and€the€disclosure€is€certainly€for€a€proper€professional€purpose.€€Again,€IÏthink€it€would€be€desirable€to€have€language€in€the€text€of€the€Rule€that€would€support€aÏComment€explaining€that€such€limited€disclosure€is€permissible€without€prior€client€consent€exceptÏin€a€few€rare€cases€in€which€revelation€of€the€clientððs€identity€and€general€nature€of€theÏrepresentation€would€disadvantage€the€client.€€The€Comment€to€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?lµ#Ôðð112€of€the€RestatementÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€offersÐ @+Ì%) Ðfurther€examples€of€such€ð ðharmless€divulgences.ðð€€€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?¾#ÔÐ ,,¸&* ÐÌÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÓ  Óà @ àG.€Other€Alternativesò ò€€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?ɾ#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€€€€€€€€Ð .(, ÐÔ#†Xô?XXXô?=¿#ÔÓè¾Óò òÐ ô.€)- Ðà  àó óó óThe€proposed€draft€does€not€limit€the€protections€of€Rule€1.6€to€ð ðconfidentialðð€informationÐ t Ðor€to€information€that€is€ð ðnot€generally€known.ðð€€I€call€the€Commissionððs€attention€to€this€becauseÏðð111€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€exempts€ð ðinformation€that€isÏgenerally€knownðð€from€its€definition€of€€ð ðconfidential€information.ðð€€Neither€Model€Rule€1.6€orÏ1.9(c)€(confidentiality€obligation€to€former€clients)€has€such€a€limitation.€Only€North€DakotaÏcurrently€permits€a€lawyer€to€reveal€or€use€information€when€the€information€has€become€ð ðpubliclyÏknown.ðð€€I€am€not€in€favor€of€changing€the€Model€Rule€in€this€regard€because€I€do€not€think€thatÏlawyers€should€fuel€further€public€dissemination€of€information€about€their€current€clients.€€JustÏbecause€information€about€a€client€may€be€generally€known€does€not€mean€it€will€be€known€by€theÏperson€who€hears€about€it€from€the€lawyer.€€Nor€does€the€fact€that€it€is€generally€€known€meanÏthat€the€information€is€not€embarrassing€or€that€further€dissemination€will€not€be€harmful€to€theÏclient.€€€€ÌÌÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÓ  ÓIII.€Paragraph€(c)ò òÐ pü  ÐÓVÄÓÌà  àó óÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßw7Ä#ÔParagraph€(c)€represents€a€proposed€answer€to€the€question€of€when,€if€ever,€a€lawyerÐ ˜$ Ðshould€be€permitted€to€disclose€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€even€thoughÏthe€client€objects€and€the€disclosure€might€have€a€significant€adverse€affect€on€the€client.€TheÏproposal€is€premised€on€the€following€assumptions:€ÌÌÒ°Ò1.€The€lawyerððs€duty€to€protect€the€confidentiality€of€information€related€to€theÏrepresentation€of€the€lawyerððs€clients€serves€important€public€and€private€purposes.€€ItÏserves€these€purposes€by€contributing€to€the€trust€and€confidence€that€is€a€hallmark€of€theÏclient„lawyer€relationship.€The€client€is€thereby€encouraged€to€seek€legal€assistance€and€toÏcommunicate€fully€and€frankly€with€the€lawyer€even€as€to€embarrassing€or€legallyÏdamaging€subject€matter.€€This€results€in€the€lawyer€having€all€the€information€the€lawyerÏneeds€to€effectively€represent€the€client€and€to€be€aware€of€situations€in€which€the€clientÏneeds€to€be€advised€to€refrain€from€engaging€in€conduct€that€is€likely€to€result€in€seriousÏinjury€to€the€legally€protected€interests€of€others.€€It€is€obviously€in€the€best€interest€of€theÏclient€to€be€well€represented.€€It€is€also€in€the€best€interest€of€the€client€to€refrain€fromÏengaging€in€wrongful€conduct.€It€is€also€generally€assumed€that€larger€interests€of€theÏsociety€are€well„served€by€the€ability€of€all€citizens€to€secure€effective€representation€of€aÏlawyer€in€connection€with€their€legal€affairs.€€It€is€equally€obvious€that€third€persons€asÏindividuals€and€the€society€at€large€have€an€interest€in€minimizing€the€occasions€in€whichÏsuch€persons€suffer€serious€injury€to€their€legally€protected€interests.€To€the€extent€thatÏconfidentiality€promotes€disclosure€to€the€lawyer€that€enables€the€lawyer€to€provide€soundÏlegal€advice€to€the€client€and€to€prevail€upon€the€client€to€act€or€refrain€from€acting€in€aÏway€that€will€€prevent€harm€to€a€third€person,€all€these€interests€will€be€well„served€by€theÏlawyerðð€duty€to€preserve€client€confidentiality.€€The€rub€comes,€of€course,€when€the€lawyerÏis€faced€with€a€situation€in€which€the€lawyer€possesses€confidential€information€that€leadsÏthe€lawyer€to€conclude€that€a€third€person€is€likely€to€suffer,€or€has€already€suffered€seriousÏinjury€„€due€to€conduct€of€the€client€or€otherwise€„€and€the€client€refuses€to€take€or€toÏauthorize€the€lawyer€to€take€steps€„€including€disclosure€of€confidential€information€„€thatÏwould€facilitate€the€prevention,€mitigation,€or€rectification€of€the€injury.€€Ì2.€The€lawyerððs€obligation€to€preserve€the€confidentiality€of€information€related€to€theÏrepresentation€of€a€client€also€recognizes€that€the€right€to€prevent€and€control€theÐ @/Ì)- Ðdissemination€of€information€about€oneððs€affairs€is€an€important€individual€right€that€aÏperson€in€need€of€legal€representation€should€not€be€required€to€surrender€just€because€heÏor€she€must€share€private€information€with€the€lawyer€in€order€to€secure€effective€legalÏassistance.€€The€protection€afforded€the€client€by€the€lawyerððs€confidentiality€obligation€isÏimportant€because€it€demonstrates€respect€for€the€autonomy€of€the€client€as€an€individual.ÏAgain€the€rub€comes€in€situations€in€which€the€clientððs€exercise€of€his€or€her€autonomy€isÏlikely€to€result€in,€or€has€already€caused,€serious€injury€to€another€person.€€ÌÌ3.€In€cases€in€which€confidentiality€conflicts€with€the€prevention,€mitigation€or€rectificationÏof€serious€loss€to€a€third€person,€the€affected€person€obviously€has€a€private€interest€inÏthere€being€an€exception€to€the€confidentiality€principle.€€Given€the€current€indisposition€ofÏour€society€to€impose€upon€the€general€citizenry€a€duty€to€rescue,€however,€the€thirdÏpersonððs€interest€should€be€understood€as€an€interest€in€the€chance€that€a€lawyer€willÏdecide€to€attempt€to€rescue€the€third€person€from€the€injury€in€question.€€Except€in€limitedÏcircumstances€in€which€society€has€deemed€it€appropriate€to€impose€a€special€obligation€onÏlawyers€to€rescue€persons€(or€tribunals)€affected€by€the€conduct€of€a€client,€the€thirdÏpersonððs€interest€should€not€be€defined€in€terms€of€the€preservation€of€an€legal€entitlementÏto€the€lawyerððs€assistance€in€preventing,€mitigating€or€rectifying€the€harm.€€Society€at€largeÏalso€has€an€interest€in€preserving€the€freedom€of€all€its€citizens,€including€lawyers,€to€takeÏaction€to€prevent,€mitigate,€or€rectify€serious€injury€to€the€legally€protected€interest€ofÏinnocent€third€persons.€ÌÌ4.€€€In€cases€in€which€confidentiality€conflicts€with€prevention,€mitigation€or€rectification€ofÏserious€loss€to€a€third€person,€the€lawyer€also€has€two€private€interests€in€there€being€anÏexception€to€the€confidentiality€principle.€€The€first„€which€is€always€at€issue€„€is€theÏlawyerððs€interest€in€the€preservation€of€the€lawyerððs€individual€autonomy€to€attempt€aÏrescue€he€or€she€thinks€is€necessary€for€the€protection€of€€an€innocent€third€person.€€AreÏthere€situations€in€which€it€is€simply€unconscionable€to€deprive€a€lawyer€of€the€right€to€actÏin€a€way€in€which€they€(and€most€of€the€public)€would€feel€morally€impelled€to€act?€€I€thinkÏso.€The€second€interest€of€the€lawyer€is€the€lawyerððs€interest€in€being€able€to€effectivelyÏdisassociate€herself€from€client€action€or€inaction€that€the€lawyer€believes€is€improper€andÏin€which€the€lawyer€might€be€implicated.€In€some€instances€a€lawyer€might€reasonablyÏbelieve€that€withdrawal€by€itself€might€not€adequately€vindicate€this€interest.€€To€the€extentÏthat€it€is€important€to€the€administration€of€justice€that€lawyers€both€behave€properly€andÏappear€to€be€behaving€properly,€the€public€is€also€well€served€by€a€rule€that€permits€theÏlawyer€to€make€such€disclosures€as€will€permit€the€lawyer€to€fully€disassociate€from€theÏclient€conduct€in€question.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð ¤&0!$ ЀÌ5.€€A€final€public€interest€that€is€frequently€discussed€in€this€context€is€the€public€interest€inÏminimizing€the€net€amount€of€harm€to€innocent€third€persons.€€The€issue€becomes€whetherÐ h)ô#' Ðstrict€confidentiality€or€liberal€freedom€to€disclose€(or€some€ð ðoptimalðð€blend€thereof)€willÏproduce€the€smallest€€aggregate€amount€of€serious€injury€to€third€persons.€€ÌThe€argument€in€favor€of€strict€confidentiality€is€premised€on€the€assumption€that€a€clientÏwho€is€secure€in€the€confidentiality€of€what€he€tells€a€lawyer€will,€more€often€than€not,Ïinform€the€lawyer€about€the€injurious€conduct,€the€lawyer€will,€more€often€than€not,€adviseÏthe€client€to€do€the€right€thing,€and€that€the€client€will,€more€often€than€not,€abide€by€theÏlawyerððs€advice.€€€If€the€client€is€not€secure€in€the€confidentiality€of€the€communications,Ïon€the€other€hand,€the€client€will,€more€often€than€not,€€lack€trust€in€the€lawyer€andÏtherefore€not€provide€the€lawyer€with€the€information€that€would,€more€often€than€not,Ïprompt€the€lawyer€to€render€the€advice€that€the€client€would,€more€often€than€not,€follow.€ÏThe€argument€in€favor€of€disclosure€is€basically€a€rejection€of€the€argument€in€favor€ofÏconfidentiality,€but€we€must€add€to€the€pro„disclosure€side€of€the€balance€the€furtherÏassumptions€that€lawyers€will,€more€often€than€not,€make€the€disclosure€that€the€client€hasÏinstructed€them€not€to€make€and€that€the€disclosure€will,€more€often€than€not,€prevent€theÏharm€in€question.€€ÌÌ6.€I€have€three€reservations€about€this€utilitarian€social€calculus:€ÌÌÒ°2ÆÒÒ` °Òa.€€The€interests€of€a€currently€identifiable€person€who€is€or€is€likely€to€become€aÏvictim€in€the€immediately€foreseeable€future€should€be€elevated€over€the€moreÏremote€interests€of€currently€unidentifiable€persons€who€might€be€injured€in€theÏfuture€because€of€the€possibility€that€the€current€disclosure,€or€a€rule€permittingÏsuch€disclosure,€might€deter€some€person€in€the€future€from€making€such€fullÏdisclosure€to€a€lawyer€as€might€permit€the€lawyer€to€successfully€dissuade€theÏclient€from€engaging€in€the€harmful€conduct.€ÌÌb.€€I€question€the€assumption€that€a€carefully€limited€exception€to€the€lawyerððsÏconfidentiality€obligation€(e.g.,€to€prevent€loss€or€life€or€serious€bodily€or€toÏprevent€substantial€financial€loss€that€the€lawyer€had€reason€to€believe€wouldÏotherwise€occur)€will€undermine€the€trust€reasonable€clients€will€have€in€a€lawyerÏwhose€assistance€they€are€seeking€for€legitimate€purposes.€More€particularly,€I€doÏnot€think€that€reasonable€clients€who€are€consulting€a€lawyer€for€a€proper€purposeÏwill€be€disinclined€to€confide€in€their€lawyer€just€because€the€lawyer€will€beÏpermitted€or€required€to€reveal€the€confidence€in€such€extraordinary€circumstances.€ÏSuch€reasonable€clients€are€also€the€ones€who€are€most€likely€to€abide€by€theirÏlawyerððs€subsequent€advice€to€act€so€that€innocent€third€person€will€not€sufferÏserious€injury.€There€may€indeed€be€some€calculating€clients€who€will€withholdÏinformation€from€their€lawyer€because€they€know€that€there€are€exceptions€to€theÏlawyerððs€duty€to€preserve€confidentiality,€and€this€may€prevent€the€lawyer€in€someÏ(but€clearly€not€all)€cases€from€learning€of€the€prospective€harm€to€the€third€person.€ÏIn€my€judgment,€however,€such€clients€are€also€the€ones€least€likely€to€abide€byÏtheir€lawyerððs€advice€„€particularly€if€they€know€that€the€lawyerððs€confidentialityÏobligation€precludes€the€lawyer€from€doing€anything€about€it.€I€would€also€noteÏthat€although€the€clientððs€assumed€unwillingness€to€confide€in€the€lawyer€willÏcertainly€reduce€the€likelihood€that€the€lawyer€will€learn€of€the€threat€to€third€partyÏinterests,€it€is€also€possible€that€the€lawyer€will€learn€of€the€threat€from€otherÐ ð.|)- Ðsources€consulted€by€the€lawyer€in€connection€with€the€representation€of€the€client.€ÌÌc.€€I€am€not€aware€of€any€evidence€that€supports€the€assumption€that€the€sacrificeÏof€current€victims€will€result€in€there€being€fewer€victims€in€the€long€run.€€Nor,€onÏthe€other€hand,€is€there€clear€evidence€establishing€that€permitting€lawyers€to€revealÏclient€confidences€will€produce€a€net€reduction€in€the€amount€of€harm€to€thirdÏpersons.€€I€think€that€uncertainty€about€the€ð ðcalculusðð€in€this€context€should€beÏresolved€in€favor€of€permitting€the€prevention,€mitigation,€or€rectification€ofÏimmediate€loss€rather€than€in€favor€of€protecting€remote€unidentifiable€futureÏvictims.€€€In€this€regard,€I€would€remind€the€Commission€that€at€least€since€theÏwidespread€adoption€of€Rule€1.13,€it€has€been€clear€that€corporate€constituentsÏmust€deal€with€the€corporationððs€lawyer€with€an€awareness€that€what€they€tell€theÏcorporate€counsel€may,€and€in€some€cases€must,€be€reported€to€higher€authoritiesÏin€the€corporation.€€Not€being€sure€of€what€implications€to€draw€from€this€fact€Ì(€e.g.,€more€or€less€corporate€wrongdoing?),€the€fact€remains€that€the€legalÏrepresentation€of€corporate€America€is€currently€conducted€according€to€rulesÏwhich€deprive€corporate€constituents€of€any€assurance€that€their€communicationsÏwill€be€confidential.€€Has€the€sky€fallen?€€Maybe?€Maybe€not?€€Do€we€know?€€No.ÏIs€it€likely€we€will€be€able€to€find€out?€€Probably€not€very€likely.€€¹Ò°` >âÒÒç%°ÒÌ6.€A€client€has€no€legitimate€private€interest€in€preventing€disclosures€that€would€preventÏserious€injury€to€legally€protected€interests€of€others€or€a€miscarriage€of€injustice.€€In€ourÏlegal€system,€however,€a€lawyerððs€client€does€have€a€legitimate€interest€in€preventingÏdisclosure€of€past€misconduct€which€might€subject€the€client€to€criminal€prosecution€orÏassist€the€prosecution€to€overcome€the€presumption€of€innocence€that€is€the€hallmark€ofÏour€criminal€justice€system.€€The€public€at€large€is€also€deemed€to€be€well€served€by€thisÏsystemic€protection€of€the€individual€against€the€power€of€the€state.€€In€situations€in€whichÏa€lawyerððs€disclosure€of€confidential€information€to€prevent€serious€injury€to€a€third€personÏdoes€not€implicate€the€client€in€a€previously€committed€crime,€the€client€will€have€noÏlegitimate€interest€that€might€override€the€interests€of€the€affected€third€not€to€be€injured.€ÏWhere€the€disclosure€would€implicate€the€client€in€past€criminal€misconduct,€a€choice€willÏhave€to€made€between€the€public€and€private€interests€served€by€the€clientððs€ð ðrightðð€not€toÏbe€implicated€in€past€criminal€conduct€confided€to€his€or€her€lawyer€and€the€public€andÏprivate€interests€in€preventing€serious€harm€to€the€innocent€third€persons.€ÌÌ7.€Because€of€the€importance€of€confidentiality,€a€lawyer€should€only€be€permitted€toÏreveal€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€in€extraordinary€situations€inÏwhich€substantial€harm€to€important€interests€of€the€lawyer€or€third€persons€can€only€beÏprevented,€mitigated,€or€rectified€by€the€lawyerððs€disclosure.€€Life,€limb,€and€freedom€fromÏillness€and€sexual€abuse€are€most€important.€€Not€being€wrongly€imprisoned€is€probably€ofÏequal€importance.€Although€certainly€not€as€important,€money€is€also€very€important,€atÏleast€when€substantial€amounts€are€at€risk€and€the€conduct€that€threatens€such€loss€hasÏbeen€branded€by€the€society€as€wrongful.€€It€is€also€extremely€important€that€no€individualÏbe€required,€as€a€condition€of€employment€or€pursuit€of€a€profession,€to€surrender€his€orÏher€autonomy€to€take€action€to€prevent€serious€injury€to€another€person€or€to€rectifyÏsubstantial€harm€caused€by€wrongful€conduct€of€the€client€in€which€he€or€she€hasÐ ð.|)- Ðunwittingly€participated.€€In€these€circumstances,€no€legal€obligation€should€prevent€aÏlawyer€or€any€other€person€from€acting€on€a€moral€impulse€to€help€the€victim.€€Ì€€€€à ` àÐ LØ Ð8.€A€lawyer€should€not€generally€be€able€to€reveal€past€misconduct€of€a€client€if€there€isÏany€likelihood€that€the€conduct€might€be€characterized€as€a€crime.€€I€feel€less€stronglyÏabout€the€revelation€of€past€misconduct€if€the€conduct€does€not€amount€to€a€crime,€but€amÏwilling€to€accept€the€broader€proposition€that€in€general€a€lawyer€should€not€be€permittedÏto€reveal€past€misconduct€of€a€client.€€It€is€easy€to€endorse€these€principles€when€theÏconduct€has€occurred,€the€loss€has€been€suffered,€and€there€is€no€way€that€the€suffering€canÏbe€ameliorated.€€€If,€for€example,€the€only€effect€of€the€lawyerððs€enforced€silence€is€toÏdeprive€the€state€of€information€necessary€for€the€successful€prosecution€of€the€lawyerððsÏclient,€I€have€no€problem€requiring€the€state€to€fend€for€itself.€€€There€are,€however,€fourÏdistinct€situations€in€which€I€think€the€balance€of€interests€tilt€in€favor€of€permissiveÏdisclosure€even€though€the€disclosure€will€implicate€the€client€in€a€crime.€They€are€asÏfollows:€ÌÌÒ°·ðÒÒ` °Òa.€The€prevention€of€loss€of€life,€serious€bodily€injury,€the€contraction€of€a€seriousÏdisease,€or€serious€sexual€abuse.€The€conduct€may€have€already€occurred€but€theÏloss€has€not€yet€been€suffered.€€Or€the€conduct€in€question€is€likely€to€recur€(as€mayÏbe€case€with€dumping€of€toxic€chemicals€or€sexual€abuse),€and€the€only€way€toÏprevent€the€recurrence€is€to€reveal€the€past€misconduct.€The€interests€of€the€victim,Ïthe€lawyer,€and€the€society€at€large€are€so€great€as€to€override€the€presumption€inÏfavor€of€confidentiality.ÌÌb.€The€prevention€or€rectification€of€the€wrongful€imprisonment€of€an€innocentÏperson.€€There€are€two€circumstances€in€which€I€have€no€problem€with€permissiveÏdisclosure€to€prevent€wrongful€imprisonment:€1)€when€the€client€was€not€theÏperpetrator€(or€an€aider€or€abettor€an€accessory€after€the€fact)€of€the€crime€inÏquestion,€or€2)€the€statute€of€limitations€has€run€for€any€crime€in€which€the€clientÏmight€be€implicated.€The€tough€issue,€of€course,€is€the€one€faced€by€the€lawyerÏwhose€client€was€the€perpetrator€of€the€offense€for€which€another€has€beenÏwrongfully€imprisoned€and€the€client€can€still€be€prosecuted€for€the€offense.€€€EvenÏin€this€tough€case,€however,€I€have€concluded€that€the€interests€of€the€victim€andÏthe€lawyer,€and€the€interests€of€society€in€the€due€administration€of€justice,€areÏsufficiently€great€to€override€the€presumption€in€favor€of€confidentiality.€€I€presentÏthis€issue€to€the€Commission€because€Massachusetts€has€recently€adopted€a€ruleÏpermitting€disclosure€to€prevent€the€wrongful€incarceration€of€another.€€ÌÌc.€The€prevention€or€rectification€of€loss€resulting€from€client€misconduct€in€whichÏthe€lawyer€was€innocently€implicated.€€For€the€client€to€so€use€the€lawyerððs€servicesÏis€an€abuse€of€the€attorney„client€relationship€that€should€discharge€the€lawyer€fromÏany€confidentiality€obligation.€€Additionally,€the€lawyerððs€interest€in€disassociatingÏhimself€from€the€clientððs€conduct€is€sufficiently€great€to€tilt€the€balance€in€favor€ofÏpermissive€disclosure,€which€may€be€the€only€way€a€lawyer€will€be€able€toÏconvincingly€prove€he€was€not€knowingly€involved€in€the€misconduct.€ÌÐ ð.|)- Ðd.€The€prevention€of€substantial€financial€loss€that€is€likely€to€result€from€pastÏmisconduct€but€has€not€yet€occurred.€€This€is€the€toughest€issue€for€me.€€I€haveÏtwo€situations€in€mind.€The€first€is€the€situation€in€which€misconduct€has€alreadyÏoccurred€„€e.g.,€a€fraudulent€loan€application€„€but€no€loss€has€yet€been€suffered€„¼e.g.,€the€lender€has€not€yet€disbursed€the€funds€to€the€client.€The€second€situation€isÏthe€one€in€which€there€has€been€misconduct,€substantial€loss€has€been€suffered,€butÏfurther€substantial€loss€might€be€prevented€by€the€lawyer€revealing€the€pastÏmisconduct,€„€e.g.,€a€fraudulent€application€for€line€of€credit,€a€substantial€sumÏalready€paid€out,€and€it€is€likely€that€substantial€additional€sums€will€be€paid€outÏabsent€revelation€of€the€fraud.€€€Although€this€is€the€closest€call€for€me,€I€haveÏdecided€that€loss€prevention€is€more€important€than€the€clientððs€right€not€to€beÏimplicated€in€past€conduct€that€may€still€be€criminal€even€though€the€lawyerððsÏdisclosure€prevents€consummation€of€the€crime€in€the€first€situation€or€preventsÏadditional€loss€in€the€second€situation.€€€€€€¹Ò°` ~þÒÒ T°ÒÌ9.€The€rules€should€focus€on€loss€prevention€rather€than€crime€or€fraud€prevention.ÌÌ10.€Except€in€cases€involving€loss€of€life,€serious€illness,€serious€bodily€harm,€or€seriousÏsexual€abuse,€a€lawyer€should€only€be€permitted€to€disclose€information€relating€to€theÏrepresentation€of€the€client€to€prevent€or€rectify€harm€to€another€if€the€harm€is€due€toÏcriminal€or€seriously€wrongful€conduct€of€the€client.€€Only€in€such€cases€can€the€lawyer€beÏsufficiently€certain€that€prevention€of€the€injury€in€question€will€be€consistent€with€publicÏpolicy.€€Ì€Ì11.€Because€of€the€importance€of€the€clientððs€confidentiality€interests,€a€lawyer€should€notÏbe€allowed€to€reveal€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€unless€the€lawyerÏis€reasonably€certain€that€the€disclosure€will€materially€contribute€to€the€prevention,Ïmitigation€or€rectification€of€the€losses€in€question.ÌÌ12.€Similarly,€except€in€cases€involving€the€prevention€of€loss€of€life,€serious€illness,Ïserious€bodily€harm€or€serious€sexual€abuse,€the€lawyer€should€not€be€permitted€to€revealÏinformation€relating€to€the€representation€of€a€client€unless€the€lawyer€is€reasonably€certainÏthat€the€harm€is€likely€to€be€suffered€by€the€prospective€victim.€€When€life€and€bodilyÏintegrity€is€at€stake,€all€that€should€be€required€of€the€lawyer€is€an€honest€belief€that€theÏinjury€is€likely€to€befall€the€victim.€ÌÌÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÒ°Š Òò òÓ  Ó€ó óA.€The€Lead„in€Phrase€Ð ¤&0!$ ÐÓ:ÓÒܰÒÒܰÒÓ  ÓÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßw#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÌ(c)€ò òUnless€prohibited€by€other€law,ó ó€a€lawyer€may€reveal€such€information€ò òas€otherwiseÐ ¸(D#& Ðpermitted€by€Rules€___,___,€and€___€€or€if€and€when,€but€onlyó ó€to€the€extent€that,€theÐ ´)@$' Ðlawyer€reasonably€believesò ò,€after€reasonable€inquiry,ó ó€ò òthat€the€disclosureó ó€of€suchÐ °*<%( Ðinformation€is€necessary:ò òÐ ¬+8&) ÐÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“Ð#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“–#ÔÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÒ°Ü“ÒÒ°Ü…ÒÓ¡Óà  àó óÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwÙ#ÔThis€lead„in€to€paragraph€(c)€applies€to€all€five€subparagraphs€and€is€intended€to€make€itÐ ¨-4(+ Ðclear€that€even€if€all€of€the€elements€specified€in€one€of€the€subparagraphs€are€present€the€lawyer€isÏonly€permitted€to€disclose€information€relating€to€the€representation€of€the€client€if€the€lawyerÐ €/ *- Ðreasonably€believes,€after€reasonable€inquiry,€that€there€is€no€alternative€way€to€prevent€the€harmÏand€that€immediate€disclosure€is€of€the€essence€to€the€prevention,€mitigation€or€rectification€of€theÏharm.€€It€also€makes€clear€that€the€lawyer€must€not€disclose€any€more€information€than€isÏnecessary€to€prevent,€mitigate€or€rectify€the€harm.€€I€added€the€cross„reference€to€other€Rules€ofÏProfessional€Conduct€in€anticipation€that€permissive€disclosure€of€client€wrongdoing€might€beÏaddressed€in€Rule€3.3€(Candor€Toward€the€Tribunal)€,€Rule€3.9€(Advocate€in€Non„AdjudicativeÏProceedings)€and€in€a€possible€new€Rule€specifying€the€responsibilities€of€lawyers€who€areÏrepresenting€trustees,€executors,€guardians,€or€other€similar€fiduciaries.€€Subparagraph€(e)Ïprovides€further€specification€of€some€steps€the€lawyer€must€take,€if€feasible,€prior€to€disclosingÏinformation€relating€the€lawyerððs€representation€of€the€client.€ÌÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?Ôò òÓ  ÓÌÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwK#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ôó ó1.€ò òð ðUnless€prohibited€by€other€lawððó óò òÐ ÀL  ÐÌÓmÓà  àó óÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“#ÔI€have€added€this€qualification€to€account€for€the€possibility€that€there€may€be€anÐ ¼H  Ðinconsistency€between€what€this€rule€permits€and€what€other€law€prohibits.€In€Tennessee,€forÏexample,€it€is€a€misdemeanor€to€reveal€privileged€information.€€The€proposed€exceptions€in€thisÏparagraph€are€broader€than€the€crime„fraud€exception€to€the€attorney„client€privilege.€€Similarly,€inÏsome€jurisdictions€a€disclosure€permitted€by€these€rules€might€be€prohibited€by€the€attorneyððsÏcommon€law€fiduciary€duties.€€The€basic€idea€is€that€our€rules€should€not€appear€to€permit€lawyersÏto€do€things€that€they€are€prohibited€from€doing€by€other€law.€€It€is€the€converse€of€theÏproposition€that€lawyers€must€reveal€confidential€information€to€comply€with€other€law.€€€€ò òÐ 0¼ ÐÓ  ÓÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÌó ó2.€ð ðò òif€and€when,€but€onlyó ó€to€the€extent€that,€ðð€Ô#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“r#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÐ ¨ ÐÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“ô#ÔÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÓfÓÌà  àÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwK#ÔI€added€the€words€ð ðif€and€when,€but€only€ðð€to€make€it€more€apparent€on€the€face€of€theÐ ,¸ Ðrule€that€the€lawyer€must€act€reasonably€in€determining€that€there€are€no€alternative€measures€thatÏwill€prevent,€mitigate,€or€rectify€the€harm€in€question,€that€disclosure€is€currently€necessary,€andÏthat€the€intended€disclosure€reveals€no€more€confidential€information€than€is€necessary€to€preventÏthe€harm.€This€will€be€reinforced€by€the€Comment.€€The€proposed€formulation€provides€a€strongerÏwarning€against€unneeded,€premature,€and€excessive€disclosure€than€does€the€current€Model€RuleÏ(ð ðmay€disclose€...€to€the€extent€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€necessaryðð).€€The€only€analogousÏprovision€in€the€ABA€Model€Code€of€Professional€Responsibility€is€DR€4„101(C)(3).€It€providesÏthat€ð ðA€lawyer€may€reveal€...[t]he€intention€of€his€client€to€commit€a€crime€and€the€informationÏnecessary€to€prevent€the€crime.ðð€€This€formulation€could€be€interpreted€to€permit€disclosure€of€theÏclientððs€intention€to€commit€the€crime€even€it€wasnððt€necessary€to€do€so.€€The€general€reference€toÏð ðinformation€necessary€to€prevent€the€crimeðð€does€not€make€it€clear€that€there€must€be€noÏalternative€means€of€preventing€the€crime,€that€immediate€disclosure€must€be€of€the€essence€to€theÏpreventive€effort,€and€that€the€disclosure€must€be€limited€to€the€minimum€information€necessary€toÏprevent€the€crime.€€€Note€also€that€the€Model€Code€formulation€provides€no€guidance€whatsoeverÏwith€respect€to€whether€the€lawyer€must€believe,€have€reason€to€believe,€or€have€substantialÏreason€to€believe€that€the€client€intends€to€commit€the€offense.ÌÌà  àðð117(A)€and€(B)€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€provide€that€ð ðaÏlawyer€may€...€disclose€confidential€client€information€when€and€to€the€extent€the€lawyerÏreasonably€believes€such€...€disclosure€is€necessary€to€....ðð€€€€Maybe€one€can€infer€ð ðifðð€fromÏð ðwhenððso€that€the€Restatement€will€be€understood€to€mean€ð ðif€and€when€and€to€the€extent€that.ððÐ ˆ/*- ЀMy€proposal,€on€the€other€hand,€touches€all€the€bases.€ð ðIfðð€alerts€the€lawyer€to€look€for€otherÏways€to€prevent€the€potential€injury.€€ð ðWhenðð€alerts€the€lawyer€to€wait€if€it€is€likely€thatÏintervening€events€may€make€disclosure€unnecessary.€€ð ðBut€only€to€extentðð€makes€it€clear€theÏdisclosure€must€be€as€limited€as€possible.€€€If€at€all€possible,€€I€think€our€rules€should€say€what€weÏintend€the€rule€to€mean,€and€I€think€that€we€should€not€allow€unnecessary,€premature€or€excessiveÏdisclosure.€€If€the€Commission€has€reservations€about€the€proposed€formulation,€my€preferredÏalternative€would€be€ð ðif,€when,€and€to€the€extent€that.ðð€Then€I€would€drop€back€to€ð ðif€,€but€only€toÏthe€extent€that.ðð€€A€final€alternative,€of€course,€would€be€to€stick€with€the€status€quo€„€ð ðto€theÏextent€thatðð€and€explain€in€the€comment€all€that€is€meant€but€not€explicitly€said€in€the€Rule.€ÌÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÌÓ  ÓÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwX*#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ô3.€ð ðReasonably€believesðð€or€ò òð ðbelievesððó ó€Ð Ô`  ÐÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“§*#ÔÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÓx*ÓÌà  àÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßw7+#ÔThe€proposal€requires€that€the€lawyer€ð ðreasonably€believeðð€that€disclosure€is€necessary.Ð äp  ÐThis€is€a€carryover€from€the€current€Model€Rule.€€The€terminology€section€of€the€Model€RulesÏexplains€that€€ð ðreasonably€believesðð€€denotes€that€a€lawyer€of€reasonable€prudence€andÏcompetence€would€ascertain€the€matter€in€question.€€€ÌÌà  à31€jurisdictions€have€adopted€the€Model€Rule€formulation.€The€ABA€Model€CodeÏformulation€is€currently€in€use€in€9€jurisdictions.€€I€am€recommending€the€continued€use€of€anÏobjective€ð ð€reasonably€believesðð€standard€to€judge€the€lawyerððs€determination€with€respect€to€theÏneed€for€and€the€timing€and€extent€of€the€disclosure.€€In€this€regard,€however,€I€would€note€thatÏUtah€permits€a€lawyer€to€breach€confidentiality€to€the€extent€the€lawyer€ð ðbelievesðð€necessary€toÏprevent€the€adverse€consequences€of€client€misconduct.€€This€indicates€that€Utah€wants€to€affordÏthe€lawyer€considerable€discretion€in€determining€whether,€when€and€to€what€extent€the€lawyerÏshould€disclose€protected€information€for€the€purpose€of€preventing,€mitigating€or€rectifying€harmÏto€a€third€person.€€There€are€no€jurisdictions€that€have€moved€in€the€other€direction€andÏconditioned€disclosure€on€the€lawyer€having€ð ðsubstantial€reason€to€believeðð€that€the€disclosure€isÏneeded.€€ÌÌà  àFinally€I€would€call€the€Commissionððs€attention€to€Massachusettsðð€recent€modification€ofÏModel€Rule€1.6(b)(1).€€The€new€Massachusetts€(b)(1)€simply€states€that€ð ðA€lawyer€may€reveal€...Ï[confidential]€information€to€prevent€the€commission€of€a€criminal€or€fraudulent€act€that€theÏlawyer€reasonably€believes€is€likely€to€result€in€death€or€substantial€bodily€harm€or€in€substantialÏinjury€to€the€financial€interests€or€proterty€of€another€€....ðð€€What€intrigues€me€is€that€in€connectionÏwith€both€the€lawyer€self„defense€exception€and€the€rectification€of€client€fraud€exception€set€forthÏin€the€immediately€following€subparagraphs,€the€lawyer€is€only€permitted€to€disclose€confidentialÏinformation€ð ðto€the€extent€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€necessaryðð€to€accomplish€the€specifiedÏpurpose.€€On€the€face€of€the€rules,€then,€it€appears€as€if€Massachusetts€has€decided€that€when€itÏcomes€to€preventing€a€crime€that€a€lawyer€reasonably€believes€is€likely€to€result€in€substantialÏharm,€the€lawyer€should€be€free€to€disclose€confidential€information€without€fear€that€aÏdisciplinary€committee€might€second€guess€the€lawyerððs€judgments€about€the€need€for,€the€timingÏof,€or€the€extent€of€the€disclosure.€€Comment€12€then€provides€that€€ÌÌÒ°Òð ðBefore€disclosure€is€made,€the€lawyer€should€have€a€reasonable€belief€that€a€crime€is€likelyÏto€be€committed€and€that€disclosure€of€confidential€information€is€necessary€to€prevent€it.ÏThe€lawyer€should€not€ignore€facts€that€would€lead€a€reasonable€lawyer€to€conclude€thatÐ P/Ü)- Ðdisclosure€is€permissible.ððÌÌÒ°È5Òà  àMy€reading€of€the€Massachusetts€Rule€and€Comment,€then,€tells€me€that€although€a€lawyerÏmust€be€reasonable€in€determining€that€the€harm€is€likely,€the€lawyer€does€not€have€to€be€(butÏshould€be)€reasonable€in€determining€that€disclosure€is€necessary€to€prevent€the€harm.€€This€seemsÏto€be€the€complete€opposite€of€the€current€Model€Rule€which,€as€will€be€discussed€in€greater€deatilÏbelow,€permits€disclosure€if€the€lawyer€ð ðbelievesðð€a€clientððs€criminal€act€is€likely€to€result€inÏimminent€loss€of€life€or€substantial€bodily€harm€but€only€to€the€extent€the€lawyer€ð ðreasonablyÏbelievesðð€disclosure€is€necessary€to€prevent€the€act.€€€I€think€the€Commission€ought€to€discuss€theÏquestions€raised€by€the€Utah€and€Massachusetts€variations.€€If€the€Commission€wishes€to€allow€aÏlawyer€more€leeway€with€respect€to€the€determination€that€disclosure€is€necessary,€it€could,€asÏdoes€Utah,€permit€disclosure€so€long€as€the€lawyer€ð ðbelievesðð€the€disclosure€is€needed.€On€theÏother€hand,€if€the€Commission€wishes€to€require€that€the€lawyer€be€very€certain€that€the€disclosureÏis€necessary,€it€should€permit€disclosure€only€if€the€lawyer€has€ð ðsubstantial€reason€to€believeðð€thatÏsuch€disclosure€is€necessary.€€It€would,€of€course,€be€possible€for€the€Commission€to€vary€theÏstandard€depending€on€the€purpose€to€be€served€by€the€disclosure€„e.g.,€a€subjective€ð ðbeliefððÏstandard€when€the€issue€is€the€necessity€of€disclosure€to€prevent€of€death€or€substantial€bodilyÏharm,€and€an€objective€ð ðreasonable€beliefðð€when€the€issue€is€the€necessity€to€prevent€substantialÏinjury€to€financial€and€property€interests€of€another,€and€a€heightened€ð ðsubstantial€reason€toÏbelieveðð€standard€when€the€lawyer€is€trying€to€collect€a€fee€from€a€recalcitrant€client.€€ò òÐ ø„ ÐÓ  ÓÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÌó ó3.€ò òð ðAfter€reasonable€inquiryððò òó óÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“S>#ÔÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔÐ äp ÐÌÓG>Óó óÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwÅ>#Ôà  àNo€jurisdiction€currently€specifies€that€a€lawyer€must€make€reasonable€inquiry€prior€toÐ ô€ Ðdetermining€whether€or€not€disclosure€of€a€harm€is€necessary€in€order€to€prevent€the€harm.€€ItÏmight€be€argued,€however,€that€a€lawyerððs€belief€cannot€be€reasonable€unless€the€lawyer€isÏreasonably€informed,€and€that€a€lawyer€will€not€be€deemed€reasonably€informed€unless€he€or€sheÏmakes€a€reasonable€inquiry€into€the€matter€at€hand.€€My€proposal€is€based€on€the€premise€thatÏconfidentiality€is€sufficiently€important€that,€if€time€and€circumstances€permit,€the€lawyer€shouldÏnot€be€allowed€to€make€a€decision€in€partial€light€if€further€inquiry€might€reasonably€be€expectedÏto€throw€more€light€on€the€situation.€€Support€for€requiring€reasonable€inquiry€can€be€found€inÏComment€d€to€ðð€117A€and€Comment€h€to€ðð117B€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÏLawyers€which€similarly€state:€ð ðSome€facts,€particularly€pertaining€to€future€acts€and€a€clientððsÏsubjective€state€of€mind,€may€be€difficult€to€ascertain.€Before€making€disclosure€in€suchÏcircumstances,€the€lawyer€òòmust€make€a€reasonable€effort€to€determine€the€relevant€facts.óóððÐ %¤" Ð(emphasis€added).€€€€€€€€€€Ìò òÓ  ÓÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“ D#ÔÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?Ôó óB.€Subparagraph€(c)(1)Ô#†Xô?X¼¼ßwMD#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ôò òÐ ð'|"% ÐÓþCÓÒܰÒÒܰÒÓ  ÓÌ(1)€Ô#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“¨D#Ôto€prevent€ò òó óthe€client€from€committing€a€criminal€actò òó ó€loss€of€life€or€serious€illness,€€bodilyÐ *Œ$' Ðharm,€or€sexual€€abuse€ó óthat€the€lawyerò ò€ó óbelievesò ò,€after€reasonable€inquiry,€ó óis€likelyò ò€ó óto€ò òresult€inÐ ü*ˆ%( Ðimminent€death€or€substantial€bodily€harmó óò ò€be€suffered€by€a€person;€or€Ð è+t&) Ðò òÓ EÓÒ°ÜïDÒÒ°ÜýDÒÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?Ôó óÌó óà  àÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwãF#ÔBecause€of€the€special€importance€attached€to€life€and€freedom€from€serious€injury,€illness,Ð è-t(+ Ðor€sexual€abuse€(particularly€in€cases€involving€children),€Subparagraph€(c)(1)€broadly€permitsÐ Ô.`), Ðdisclosure€of€otherwise€protected€information€to€prevent€death€and€serious€illness€or€bodily€harmÏwithout€regard€to€the€cause€of€the€threat.€€The€scope€of€the€proposed€exception€is€considerablyÏbroader€than€current€Model€Rule€1.6(b)(1).€€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€€€Ð LØ ÐÌÒܰÒÒܰÒÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÓ  Ó1.€ð ðto€prevent€ò òthe€client€from€committing€a€criminal€act€likely€to€result€in€imminentó óÐ $ ° Ðdeath€or€ò òsubstantialó ó€ò òserious€ó óbodily€harm,€ò òillness,€or€sexual€abuseÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“_I#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÔ#†Š²“ Š ŠŠ²“ I#ÔÔ‡Š²“ Š ŠŠ²“Ô€...€likely€to€beÐ  ¬ Ðsuffered€by€a€personððó óÐ  ¨ ÐÌÒ°ÜCIÒÒ°ÜQIÒÓ~IÓ€à  àÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“qJ#ÔÔ#†Xô?XXXô?³J#ÔProposed€paragraph€(c)(1)€represents€a€substantial€broadening€of€the€lawyerððs€discretionÐ    Ðto€reveal€client€confidences€to€prevent€loss€of€life€or€serious€personal€injury.€€Unlike€the€currentÏModel€Rule,€it€does€not€limit€disclosure€to€situations€in€which€the€harmful€acts€are€done€by€theÏclient.€€Nor€must€there€be€a€commission€of€a€crime.€€The€limited€focus€of€the€Model€Rule€on€deathÏor€substantial€bodily€harm€has€been€broadened€to€encompass€serious€bodily€harm,€illness€or€sexualÏabuse.€€€I€added€the€reference€to€serious€illness€to€deal€with€serious€communicable€diseases€likeÏAIDS€and€serious€illnesses€such€as€cancer€that€can€be€caused€by€toxic€wastes.€€I€added€theÏreference€to€sexual€abuse€to€deal€overtly€with€non„forcible€rape€and€sexual€abuse€of€children.€€AÏclientððs€threat€of€suicide€would€also€justify€disclosure€of€such€confidential€information€as€necessaryÏto€prevent€the€suicide€even€if€attempted€suicide€is€not€a€crime.€Note€also€that€the€proposedÏformulation€would€permit€disclosure€to€prevent€the€wrongful€execution€of€an€innocent€person.ÏThe€harm€need€only€be€likely€not€imminent.€€ÌÌà  à24€jurisdictions€presently€track€the€ABA€Model€Rule€to€the€extent€that€disclosure€isÏpermitted€(or€required€as€in€8€of€the€24€jurisdictions)€if€necessary€to€prevent€death€or€substantialÏbodily€harm.€€New€Hampshire€stands€alone€in€not€requiring€that€the€bodily€harm€be€substantial.€ÏAlabama,€Delaware,€Kentucky,€Louisiana,€Missouri,€Montana,€and€Rhode€Island€„€have€adoptedÏthe€ABA€Model€Rule€in€its€current€form.€€Alaska,€Arizona,€Connecticut,€D.C.,€Florida,€Hawaii,,ÏNevada,€New€Hampshire,€New€Jersey,€Utah,€Pennsylvania,€Maryland,€North€Dakota€andÏWisconsin€do€not€currently€require€that€the€death€or€substantial€bodily€harm€be€ð ðimminent.ðð€NewÏMexico€tracks€the€Model€Rule€except€that€it€exhorts€the€lawyer€to€disclose€by€substitutingÏð ðshouldðð€for€ð ðmay.ðð€ò òÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ €  ÐÒ'ݰÒÌÒ°eSÒó óà  àArkansas,€Colorado,€Georgia,€Oklahoma,€Idaho,€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?1S#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔIllinois,€Indiana,€Iowa,€Kansas,€Maine,Ð X"ä ÐMinnesota,€Michigan,€Mississippi,€Nebraska,€New€York,€Ohio,€Oklahoma,€Oregon,€SouthÏCarolina,€Tennessee,€Washington,€Vermont,€West€Virginia,€and€Wyoming€permit€disclosure€toÏprevent€the€client€from€committing€any€crime.€€Most€of€these€jurisdictions€use€the€ABA€ModelÏCode€formulation:€ð ðthe€lawyer€may€reveal€the€intention€of€his€client€to€commit€a€crime€and€theÏinformation€necessary€to€prevent€the€crime.ðð€Although€these€jurisdictions€permit€more€disclosureÏthat€the€Current€Model€Rule€„€e.g.€disclosure€would€be€permitted€to€prevent€any€criminal€sexualÏmisconduct€„€€they€would€not€permit€disclosure€in€life„threatening€situations€that€were€not€theÏproduct€of€a€clientððs€crime.€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?êS#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ ¸)D$' ÐÌà  àThe€most€recent€version€of€ðð117(A)€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÏLawyers€provides€that€ð ð€a€lawyer€may€use€or€disclose€confidential€client€information€when€and€toÏthe€extent€that€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€such€use€or€disclosure€is€necessary€to€prevent€òòdeathÐ h-ô'+ Ðor€serious€bodily€harm€to€a€person.óóðð€(emphasis€supplied).€€The€cause€of€the€death€or€the€seriousÐ T.à(, Ðbodily€harm€is€irrelevant.€€If€the€cause€of€the€injury€is€the€conduct€of€a€person,€it€does€not€matterÐ @/Ì)- Ðwhether€the€person€is€the€lawyerððs€client€or€whether€the€act€the€threatens€life€or€limb€is€a€crime.Ô#†Xô?XXXô?W#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€Ô#†Xô?XXXô? Z#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ t ÐThe€final€draft€was€adopted€in€place€of€a€prior€draft€of€ððÔ#†Xô?XXXô?LZ#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô117(A)€that€limited€disclosure€toÐ `ì Ðcircumstances€in€which€the€lawyer€reasonably€believed€the€disclosure€was€necessary€ð ðto€preventÏdeath€or€serious€bodily€injury€from€occurring€as€the€result€of€a€crime€that€the€client€has€committedÏor€intends€to€commit.ðð€€ÌÌà  àThe€Comment€to€the€Restatement€concisely€but€eloquently€explains€that€ð ð[t]he€exceptionÏrecognized€by€the€Section€is€based€on€the€overriding€value€of€life€and€physical€integrity.ðð€WithÏrespect€to€the€proposed€inclusion€of€serious€illness€and€sexual€abuse,€the€Comment€to€ðð117(A)ÏÔ#†Xô?XXXô?àZ#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôasserts€that€ð ð[s]erious€bodily€injury€within€the€meaning€of€the€Section€includes€life„threateningÐ À L  Ðillness€and€injuries€and€consequences€of€...€child€sexual€abuse.ðð€€No€jurisdiction,€however,€makesÏspecific€reference€to€illness€or€sexual€abuse€in€their€rules.€€Interestingly,€Massachusetts€hasÏrecently€adopted€a€Comment€which€explains€that€the€reference€in€its€rule€1.6(b)(1)€to€ð ðbodily€harmÏð ðis€not€meant€to€require€physical€injury€as€a€prerequisite.ðð€€By€way€of€example,€the€Comment€saysÏthat€an€act€of€statutory€rape€would€fall€within€the€concept€of€bodily€harm.€ÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?g]#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôò òòòÌóóó óà  àÔ#†Xô?XXXô?`#ÔThe€current€Model€Rule€only€permits€disclosure€if€the€bodily€harm€is€ð ðsubstantial.ðð€€InÐ 4À ÐModel€Rule€terms,€ð ðsubstantialðð€when€used€in€reference€to€degree€or€extent€denotes€ð ða€materialÏmatter€of€clear€and€weighty€importance.ðð€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€Materiality€is€not€defined.Ô#†Xô?XXXô?da#Ô€€With€the€exception€of€NewÐ  ˜ ÐHampshire€(which€permits€disclosure€to€prevent€any€bodily€harm),€all€jurisdictions€that€limit€Ïdisclosures€to€those€necessary€to€prevent€criminal€acts€likely€to€result€in€death€or€bodily€harm€Ïrequire€that€the€harm€be€ð ðsubstantial.ðð€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?Ôðð117(A)€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÐ Ð\ ÐLawyers,€on€the€other€hand,€€permits€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?áb#Ôdisclosure€to€prevent€ð ðseriousðð€bodily€harm.€€No€definitionÐ ¼H Ðof€serious€is€provided.€€I€regard€a€serious€injury€to€be€somewhat€less€damaging€than€a€substantialÏinjury.€€€In€the€interest€of€expanding€somewhat€the€lawyerððs€discretion€to€disclose€confidentialÏinformation€to€protect€innocent€third€parties,€I€am€recommending€that€the€lawyerððs€discretion€toÏdisclose€be€broadened€to€include€cases€in€which€the€harm€to€be€prevented€is€serious.€€ÌÌà  àAt€this€point€I€have€not€attempted€to€draft€a€definition€of€ð ðseriousðð€that€would€try€toÏcapture€the€sense€in€which€ð ðseriousðð€ranks€below€ð ðsubstantialðð€on€a€scale€to€be€used€toÏdifferentiate€between€degrees€of€injury€ranging€from€ð ðinconsequentialðð€to€ð ðminorðð€to€ð ðsignificantððÏto€ð ðseriousðð€to€ð ðsubstantialðð€to€ð ðsevere.ðð€€The€problem€is€similar€to€that€presented€by€the€referenceÏin€Professor€Mooreððs€Proposed€Rule€1.7€to€a€ð ðsignificantðð€risk€of€an€adverse€affect€on€theÏrepresentation.€She€prefers€that€formulation€to€the€ALI€Restatementððs€reference€to€a€ð ðsubstantialððÏrisk€of€an€adverse€affect€on€the€representation.€€I€note€this€only€to€call€the€Commissionððs€attentionÏto€the€need€for€us€to€be€consistent€with€respect€to€terminology€throughout€the€Rules€and€to€decideÏthe€extent€to€which€we€should€attempt€to€craft€definitions€in€an€effort€to€throw€some€additionalÏlight€on€what€is€meant€by€such€general€concepts€as€material,€significant,€serious,€or€substantial.€AnÏalternative€approach€would€be€to€eschew€definitions€and€try€to€use€discussion€and€examples€in€theÏComment€to€convey€a€sense€of€what€we€mean€by€such€useful€but€necessarily€ambiguous€concepts.ÌÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôà  àÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÌÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“tj#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÓ  Ó2.€ð ðbelieves€or€ò òð ðreasonably€believesððó ó€Ð P+Ü%) ÐÓÖjÓ€Ô#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“·j#ÔÐ L,Ø&* Ðà  àModel€Rule€1.6(b)(1)€currently€permits€a€lawyer€to€disclose€information€relating€to€the€Ïrepresentation€of€a€client€ð ðto€the€extent€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€necessary€to€prevent€theÏclient€from€committing€a€criminal€act€that€the€lawyer€òòbelievesóó€is€likely€to€result€in€imminent€deathÐ  /¬)- Ðor€substantial€bodily€harm.ðð€(Emphasis€added).€€This€represented€a€change€from€the€KutakÏCommissionððs€original€proposal€which€required€that€the€lawyer€ð ðreasonably€believeðð€that€death€orÏsubstantial€bodily€harm€was€likely€to€result€from€a€criminal€act€of€the€lawyerððs€client.ÌÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?Ij#Ôà  àThe€ð ðbelieves€is€likelyðð€formulation€of€the€current€Model€Rule€has€been€adopted€in€18Ð $ ° Ðjurisdictions,€including€4€jurisdictions€which€mandate€rather€than€merely€permit€disclosure.€OnlyÏAlaska,€D.C.,€Wisconsin€and€now€Massachusetts€have€adopted€the€Kutak€Commissionððs€originalÏformulation.€€The€24€jurisdictions€which€permit€disclosure€of€a€clientððs€ð ðintention€to€commit€aÏcrime€and€the€information€necessary€to€prevent€the€crimeðð€employ€a€formulation€that€seems€to€begÏthis€question.€€ÌÌà  àÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔThe€most€recent€version€of€ðð117(A)€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÐ ˜$  ÐLawyers€provides€that€ð ð€a€lawyer€may€use€or€disclose€confidential€client€information€when€and€toÏthe€extent€that€the€lawyer€òòreasonably€believes€such€use€or€disclosure€is€necessaryóó€to€prevent€deathÐ pü  Ðor€serious€bodily€harm€to€a€person.ðð€(emphasis€added).€€The€Comment€to€ðð117(A)€of€the€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?(p#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ \è  ÐRestatement€indicates€that€a€lawyer€cannot€reasonably€believe€that€disclosure€is€necessary€unlessÏthe€lawyer€ð ðreasonably€believesðð€that€the€death€or€bodily€harm€is€likely.€€This€differs€from€theÏcurrent€Model€Rule€which€permits€disclosure€reasonably€necessary€to€prevent€a€criminal€act€theÏlawyer€òòbelievesóó€likely€to€result€imminent€death€...ððÔ#†Xô?XXXô?r#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€(emphasis€added)Ð  ˜ ÐÌà  àThis€difference€between€the€Restatement€and€the€current€version€of€Rule€1.6(b)(1)Ïhighlights€a€choice€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?Ês#Ôthe€Commission€needs€to€make€about€how€certain€a€lawyer€should€be€aboutÐ Ð\ Ðthe€likelihood€that€a€person€will€suffer€death€or€significant€bodily€harm€or€contract€a€seriousÏdisease.€€This€is€a€prediction€of€what€might€happen€in€the€future€so€the€disciplinary€committeeÏmust€assess€the€lawyerððs€decisions€in€terms€of€the€lawyerððs€belief€rather€than€knowledge.€It€is€notÏpossible€to€know€the€future.€€The€€question€is€how€strong€we€want€the€lawyerððs€belief€aboutÏimpending€harm€to€be€before€permitting€the€lawyer€to€take€up€the€question€of€whether,€when,€andÏhow€much€disclosure€is€needed€to€prevent€what€the€lawyer€believes,€or€reasonably€believes,€or€hasÏsubstantial€reason€to€believe,€is€likely€to€occur.ÌÌà  àThe€subjective€ð ðbeliefðððð€standard€confers€upon€the€lawyer€much€more€discretion€in€whatÏwill€necessarily€be€a€very€troubling€situation€and€in€which€it€may€be€very€difficult€to€predict€theÏcourse€of€future€events.€€A€ð ðreasonable€beliefððstandard€permits€more€second„guessing€of€theÏlawyerððs€decision€and€will€probably€tilt€the€scale€against€disclosure.€If€there€is€no€risk€of€disciplineÏfor€not€disclosing€(which€is€the€case€in€jurisdictions€in€which€disclosure€to€prevent€loss€of€life€orÏother€serious€harm€is€optional)€and€there€is€some€risk€that€the€lawyer€might€be€disciplined€if€he€orÏshe€discloses,€a€prudent€lawyer€would€probably€err€on€the€side€of€non„disclosure.€€Is€that€what€weÏwant€when€life€and€bodily€integity€is€at€stake?€€€Ô‡Xô?XXXô?ÔÐ '"% ÐÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?~z#Ôà  à€Given€the€importance€of€the€third€person€interests€at€stake,€I€recommend€retention€of€theÐ h)ô#' ÐModel€Ruleððs€subjective€ð ðbelieves€ð ð€standard.€€If€the€Commission€follows€this€recommendation,€aÏdisciplinary€authority€would€assess€the€lawyerððs€decision€to€disclose€confidential€information€toÏprevent€loss€of€life€or€serious€illness,€injury,€or€sexual€abuse€in€terms€of€the€lawyerððs€€ð ðbeliefðð€thatÏthe€injury€was€likely€to€be€suffered€and€the€lawyerððs€ð ðreasonable€beliefðð€the€lawyerððs€disclosureÏwas€necessary€to€prevent€the€injury.€€In€deciding€whether€to€recommend€the€use€of€a€subjectiveÏð ðbeliefðð€standard€or€an€objective€ð ðreasonable€belief,ðð€I€also€considered€the€relative€difficulty€of€theÐ ð.|)- Ðdetermination€the€lawyer€is€being€required€to€make€and€whether€lawyers,€by€virtue€of€their€trainingÏand€experience,€can€be€expected€to€make€such€a€judgment€ð ðcorrectlyðð€„€i.e.€the€judgment€thatÏwould€be€made€by€the€ð ðreasonable€lawyer.ðð€€Generally€I€think€lawyers€are€better€equipped€toÏdetermine€with€reasonable€certainty€that€particular€means€are€needed€to€prevent€a€harm€than€theyÏare€equipped€to€make€the€kinds€of€judgments€that€must€be€made€to€predict€with€reasonableÏconfidence€the€likelihood€that€someone€is€going€to€be€killed€or€seriously€injured,€contract€a€seriousÏillness,€or€be€sexually€abused.€€€The€latter€judgments€are€not€ones€for€which€lawyers€have€specialÏtraining€or€presumed€expertise.€€On€the€other€hand,€judgments€about€how€to€advise€persons€toÏprotect€themselves€or€which€persons€might€be€able€to€effectively€intervene€to€protect€the€potentialÏvictim€seems€to€be€more€within€a€lawyerððs€presumed€competence.€€This€suggests€that€it€isÏreasonable€to€require€the€lawyer€to€be€more€calculating€with€respect€to€the€necessity€of€preventiveÏmeans€than€with€respect€to€the€likelihood€that€the€injury€is€likely€to€suffered.€€Although€I€thinkÏsuch€an€analysis€is€sensible,€I€am€less€sure€that€it€is€compelling.€€Is€it€really€that€much€easier,€andÏare€lawyers€that€much€better€equipped,€to€determine€what€needs€to€be€done€in€response€to€a€threatÏthan€it€is€for€them€to€determine€that€a€threat€exists,€particularly€when€the€judgments€are€not€totallyÏunrelated€and€both€judgments€will€be€made€in€what€necessarily€will€be€an€emotionally€chargedÏsituation.€€Having€said€this,€however,€the€point€remains€that€these€questions€must€be€asked€andÏanswered€by€the€Commission€if€for€no€other€reason€than€to€resolve€the€inconsistency€between€theÏcurrent€Model€Rule€and€the€Restatement.€ÌÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôà  àÔ#†Xô?XXXô?í„#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôò òÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ô¹Ó  Óó ó3.€ò òð ðafter€reasonable€inquiryððò ò€ó óÐ ø„ Ðó óÔ#†Š²“ Š ŠŠ²“;…#ÔÓ}…ÓÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“]…#ÔÌà  àNo€jurisdiction€currently€requires€that€a€lawyer€make€reasonable€inquiry€prior€toÏdetermining€whether€or€not€loss€of€life€etc.€is€likely€to€be€suffered€by€a€person.€It€might€be€Ïargued,€however,€that€a€lawyerððs€belief€cannot€be€reasonable€unless€the€lawyer€is€reasonablyÏinformed,€and€that€a€lawyer€will€not€be€deemed€reasonably€informed€unless€he€or€she€makeÏreasonable€inquiry€into€the€matter€at€hand.€€My€proposal€is€based€on€the€premise€thatÏconfidentiality€is€sufficiently€important€that,€if€time€and€circumstances€permits,€the€lawyer€shouldÏnot€be€allowed€to€make€a€decision€in€partial€light€if€further€inquiry€might€reasonably€be€expectedÏto€throw€more€light€on€the€situation.€€Support€for€requiring€reasonable€inquiry€can€be€found€inÏComment€d€to€ðð€117A€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€which€states€ÌÌÒ°Ò€ð ð€A€lawyerððs€discretion€to€take€appropriate€action€to€prevent€harm€under€this€Section€isÏpredicated€on€the€lawyerððs€reasonable€belief€that€the€action€is€necessary€to€prevent€deathÏor€serious€bodily€injury€to€a€person.€Some€facts,€particularly€pertaining€to€future€acts€andÏprobabilities€and€a€clientððs€or€third€personððs€subjective€state€of€mind,€may€be€difficult€for€aÏperson€in€the€lawyerððs€position€to€ascertain.€Before€making€disclosure€where€such€facts€areÏambiguous,€the€lawyer€must€make€a€reasonable€effort€to€determine€the€relevant€facts,Ïtaking€into€account€the€risks€inherent€in€either€the€lawyerððs€action€or€inaction.ðð€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÒ°w‰ÒÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÔ‡Š²“ Š ŠŠ²“Ôò òÓòÓÌó ó4.€An€Alternative€„€Mandatory€Disclosure€€Ô#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“0Œ#ÔÐ ”* %( ÐÔ#†Xô?XXXô?OŒ#ÔÓqŒÓÌÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôà  àIt€is€important€to€emphasize€that€paragraph€(c)(1)€only€permits€a€lawyer€to€makeÐ |,'* Ðdisclosure€necessary€to€prevent€the€death€or€serious€illness,€bodily€harm,€or€sexual€abuse.€€It€doesÏnot€require€that€the€lawyer€do€so.€€Arizona,€Connecticut,€Florida,€New€Jersey,€Nevada,€Virginia,Ïand€Wisconsin,€on€the€other€hand,€€require€disclosure€when€death€and€substantial€bodily€harm€is€atÐ @/Ì)- Ðstake.€€Nevada€tracks€the€Model€Rule€except€for€the€fact€that€disclosure€is€required€rather€thanÏpermitted.€€Arizona€and€Connecticut€track€Nevada,€except€that€death€or€substantial€bodily€harmÏdoes€not€have€to€be€ð ðimminent.ðð€€Wisconsin€and€New€Jersey€track€Arizona€and€Connecticut,Ïexcept€that€the€lawyer€must€ð ðreasonably€believeðð€that€the€death€or€substantial€bodily€harm€isÏlikely.€€€Interestingly,€New€Jersey€defines€a€reasonable€belief€as€ð ða€belief€or€conclusion€of€aÏreasonable€lawyer€that€is€based€upon€information€that€has€some€foundation€in€fact€and€constitutesÏprima€facie€evidence€of€the€matters€...€[in€question].ðð€€ÌÌà  àIllinois€requires€that€ð ðthe€lawyer€reveal€information€about€a€client€to€the€extent€it€appearsÏnecessary€to€prevent€the€client€from€committing€an€act€that€would€result€in€death€or€serious€bodilyÏharm.ðð€€In€addition€to€this€required€disclosure,€an€Illinois€lawyer€is€permitted€but€not€required€toÏreveal€the€intention€of€a€client€to€commit€any€crime.€Texas€takes€a€slightly€different€tack€and€callsÏfor€mandatory€disclosure€€ð ð[w]hen€a€lawyer€has€confidential€information€clearly€establishing€that€aÏclient€is€likely€to€commit€a€criminal€...€act€that€is€likely€to€result€in€death€or€substantial€bodilyÏharm.€€Disclosure€is€permitted€only€€ð ðto€the€extent€revelation€reasonably€appears€necessary€toÏprevent€...€the€client€from€committing€the€criminal€act.ðð€€As€in€Illinois,€a€Texas€lawyer€is€alsoÏpermitted€but€not€required€to€reveal€confidential€information€ð ðwhen€the€lawyer€has€reason€toÏbelieve€it€is€necessary€to€do€so€to€prevent€the€client€from€committing€a€criminal€act.ðð€€Finally,ÏFlorida€€requires€disclosure€to€the€extent€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€necessary€to€prevent€theÏclient€from€committing€any€crime€or€to€ð ðprevent€a€death€or€substantial€bodily€harm€to€another.ðð€€ÌÌà  àIt€is€interesting€to€note€that€in€Connecticut,€New€Jersey€Nevada€and€Wisconsin€the€lawyerÏwho€is€faced€with€a€life/death€choice€is€either€required€to€disclose€or€prohibited€from€disclosingÏclient€information.€€There€is€no€provision€for€permissive€disclosure.€If€a€lawyer€does€not€discloseÏbecause€of€an€unreasonable€misjudgment€about€the€likely€consequences€of€a€criminal€act,€the€ruleÏwill€be€violated.€€The€same€will€be€true,€however,€if€such€a€misjudgment€leads€the€lawyer€toÏdisclose.€€The€lawyer€had€better€get€it€right.€€In€Arizona,€Florida,€Illinois€and€Texas,€on€the€otherÏhand,€lawyers€are€expressly€permitted€to€disclose€crimes€without€regard€to€risk€of€death€andÏsubstantial€bodily€harm.€€As€long€as€the€lawyer€reasonably€gauges€the€clientððs€intention€to€commitÏa€crime,€the€lawyer€is€permitted€to€disclose€the€crime€even€though€the€lawyer€did€so€because€of€anÏunreasonable€judgment€that€death€or€substantial€bodily€harm€was€likely€to€result€from€the€crime.€ÏIn€Connecticut,€New€Jersey,€Nevada€and€Wisconsin€€there€is€no€such€cushion€in€the€Rules€asÏwould€protect€the€lawyer€for€erring€on€the€side€of€disclosure€when€there€is€uncertainty€(as€thereÏwell€might€be)€about€the€likelihood€that€the€client€will€engage€in€criminal€conduct€and€what€theÏconsequences€of€that€conduct€will€be.€North€Dakotaððs€Rule€1.6€takes€a€slightly€different€approachÏto€the€relationship€between€mandatory€and€permissive€disclosure€for€the€purpose€of€preventing€Ïdeath€or€substantial€bodily€harm.€€Disclosure€is€mandatory€ð ðto€the€extent€the€lawyer€believesÏnecessary€to€prevent€the€client€from€committing€an€act€that€the€lawyer€believes€is€likely€to€result€inÏimminent€death€or€imminent€substantial€bodily€harm.ðð€€Disclosure€is€permitted€but€not€requiredÏð ðto€the€extent€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€necessary€to€prevent€the€client€from€committing€aÏcriminal€...€act€that€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes€is€likely€to€result€in€non„imminent€death€...€[or]Ïnon„imminent€substantial€bodily€harm.€€In€either€case,€North€Dakota€specifically€requires€that€ð ðtheÏrevelation€be€no€greater€than€the€lawyer€reasonably€necessary€to€the€purpose.ðð€€€ÌÌà  àI€am€not€recommending€that€a€lawyer€be€required€to€reveal€information€relating€to€theÏrepresentation€of€a€client€unless€they€are€acting€as€ð ðan€officer€of€the€courtðð€in€an€adjudicativeÐ ð.|)- Ðproceeding€(such€duty€to€be€set€forth€in€Rule€3.3),€are€required€by€general€law€or€a€court€order€(asÏwould€be€any€other€citizen)€to€make€the€disclosure€in€question,€or€need€to€correct€a€priorÏstatement€that€the€lawyer€comes€to€know€is€now€false.€€If€the€Commission€decides€to€entertain€theÏpossibility€of€requiring€disclosure€to€prevent€loss€of€life€or€serious€bodily€harm,€however,€I€wouldÏrecommend€limiting€the€mandatory€disclosure€obligation€to€situations€in€which€the€lawyer€hasÏsubstantial€reason€to€believe€that€the€disclosure€is€necessary€to€prevent€what€the€lawyer€hasÏsubstantial€reason€to€believe€will€be€imminent€death€or€bodily€harm.€€Such€a€mandatory€obligationÏwould€be€in€addition€to€the€permission€granted€to€the€lawyer€by€the€proposed€rules€to€discloseÏthreats€to€life€and€limb€when€the€lawyer€is€less€certain€about€what€the€future€will€hold.€€ÌÌà  àAs€relates€to€mandatory€disclosure€of€client€misconduct,€I€see€no€reason€to€require€aÏlawyer€to€be€more€of€a€police€person€than€any€other€citizen,€except€when€the€lawyer€is€in€courtÏsimultaneously€functioning€as€an€advocate€and€as€an€officer€of€the€court.€€I€have€no€problem€withÏa€limited€police€person€role€(limited€to€offenses€against€the€administration€of€justice)€for€theÏlawyer€when€the€lawyer€is€participating€in€a€judicial€proceeding.€€Other€than€that,€however,€I€seeÏno€reason€to€require€a€lawyer€to€be€more€(or€less)€of€a€policeman€than€any€other€citizen.€€€WereÏthere€a€duty€to€rescue€that€was€applicable€to€all€citizens,€I€would€not€argue€to€exempt€lawyersÏfrom€that€duty,€but€in€the€absence€of€such€a€duty€I€see€nothing€in€the€lawyerððs€role€or€presumedÏspecial€expertise€that€would€justify€imposing€a€special€duty€to€rescue€on€lawyers.€€ÌÌà  àÔ#†Xô?XXXô?#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔAs€relates€to€permissive€disclosure,€on€the€other€hand,€I€am€very€hesitant€to€deprive€aÐ äp Ðlawyer€of€the€capacity€to€act€to€prevent€loss€of€life€or€substantial€bodily€harm€when€the€lawyerððsÏconscience€says€action€must€be€taken.€€When€life€and€limb€is€at€stake,€I€am€very€comfortable€inÏpermitting€the€lawyer€to€favor€the€interests€of€the€victim€over€any€interests€of€the€client.€€Also€withÏrespect€to€the€arguments€€against€disclosure€that€focus€on€the€need€for€the€lawyer€to€respect€theÏclientððs€autonomy€„€arguments€with€which€I€strongly€agree€in€most€contexts€„€I€also€have€noÏproblem€allowing€the€autonomy€of€a€person€who€would€prevent€loss€of€life€or€serious€bodily€harmÏto€override€the€autonomy€of€a€person€who€would€inflict€such€injury€or€who€would€prohibitÏanother€from€taking€action€to€prevent€such€injury.€ÌÌà  àIf€the€Commission€is€strongly€pro„disclosure€when€life€or€limb€is€at€stake€and€desires€toÏgive€the€lawyer€more€discretion€to€disclose€confidential€information€in€such€a€situation€than€inÏother€situations€in€which€less€important€interests€are€at€stake€€„€€as€might€be€reflected€in€theÏadoption€of€a€rule€that€only€requires€the€lawyer€to€believe€in€good€faith€that€loss€of€life€orÏsubstantial€bodily€harm€is€likely€and€then€only€requires€the€lawyer€to€believe€in€good€faith€that€theÏdisclosures€to€be€made€are€necessary€„€€it€might€be€wise€to€address€this€issue€in€a€paragraph€of€itsÏown,€rather€than€including€it€in€a€single€paragraph€that€specifies€all€the€circumstances€in€whichÏdisclosure€is€permitted.€ÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?o¦#ÔÓ  ÓÌÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔC.€Subparagraph€(c)(2)ò òÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwÕ¬#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÐ h)ô#' ÐÓȬÓÒܰÒÒܰÒò òÓ  ÓÌó óÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“0­#Ô(2)€to€prevent€or€rectify€what€the€lawyer€knows€ò ò[has€reason€to€believe]ó ó€to€be€the€wrongfulÐ |+&) Ðimprisonment€of€a€person€ò ò[for€a€felony]ó ó;€oró óÐ l,ø&* ÐÓ“­ÓÒ²hÜÒò òÌÒÜ”®Òó óÒ°ÜÒÒ°ÜÒà  àMassachusetts€is€the€only€jurisdiction€that€currently€permits€disclosure€to€prevent€or€rectifyÐ H.Ô(, Ðthe€wrongful€imprisonment€of€a€person.€€The€Massachusetts€text€only€refers€to€ð ðpreventingðð€theÐ 4/À)- Ðwrongful€incarceration€of€another,€but€I€think€that€a€lawyer€will€be€preventing€wrongfulÏincarceration€when€disclosure€is€made€to€prevent€the€wrongful€continuation€of€the€imprisonment.€€ÏComment€c€to€the€most€recent€version€of€€ðð117(A)€of€the€ALI€Restatement€of€the€Law€GoverningÏLawyers€addresses€this€issue€by€a€Comment€which€explains€that€€ð ðserious€bodily€injury€within€theÏmeaning€of€the€Section€includes€life„threatening€illness€and€injuries€òòand€the€consequences€of€suchÐ $ ° Ðevents€as€imprisonment€for€a€substantial€periodóó€and€child€sexual€abuse.ðð(emphasis€added).€€I€doÐ  œ Ðnot€think€this€issue€should€be€dealt€with€in€a€comment€that€€is€based€on€what€is€at€best€anÏextremely€strained€interpretation€of€the€rule.€€The€Commission€needs€to€confront€this€issue€head„¼on.€€The€problem€with€this€exception€is€that€it€permits€the€lawyer€to€disclose€a€clientððs€past€crimeÏif€necessary€to€prevent€or€rectify€the€wrongful€imprisonment€of€another€person.€€Although€I€doÏnot€think€that€the€clientððs€privilege€against€self„€incrimination€is€implicated,€permitting€a€lawyer€toÏreveal€a€past€crime€as€inconsistent€with€a€longstanding€professional€tradition€prohibiting€lawyersÏfrom€taking€any€action€that€might€incriminate€their€client€in€past€criminal€activity€in€which€theÏclient€had€not€employed€the€services€of€the€lawyer.€€Having€said€this,€however,€I€would€rank€lossÏof€freedom€on€a€par€with€serious€physical€injury€without€regard€to€the€possibility€of€physical€orÏsexual€abuse€by€other€prisoners.€€I€think€wrongful€convictions€have€to€be€specially€troubling€toÏlawyers€because€the€injury€results€from€a€failure€of€the€justice€system€around€which€our€vocationÏrevolves€and€for€the€sound€administration€of€which€€we€bear€special€responsibility.€€I€consideredÏlimiting€what€the€lawyer€would€be€permitted€to€disclose€„€e.g.,€no€disclosure€of€anything€the€clientÏcould€not€be€compelled€to€tell€the€government€„€but€in€the€end€I€have€chosen€to€present€the€issueÏto€the€Commission€in€a€form€which€will€require€us€to€grapple€with€the€full€implications€of€whatÏMassachusetts€has€done€in€full€view€of€the€profession€and€what€the€ALI€Restatement€has€lessÏovertly€tried€to€accomplish€in€its€Comment.€€Having€opened€this€Pandoraððs€box,€I€am€wondering€ifÏthe€Commission€also€needs€to€consider€permitting€disclosure€to€prevent€or€rectify€the€wrongfulÏimposition€of€a€substantial€fine.€€Indeed€given€the€stigma€and€civil€disabilities€that€attach€to€beingÏconvicted€of€any€felony,€one€could€€even€contemplate€permissive€disclosure€to€prevent€or€rectifyÏwhat€the€lawyer€knows€to€be€a€wrongful€conviction€of€a€felony,€without€regard€to€whether€theÏinnocent€person€was€fined€or€imprisoned.€€€€€€¹ÒܰͮÒÒܰ¿®ÒÒF ÜÒÌÒÜ¢ºÒÒ°ÜÒÓ  ÓÔ‡¼ßw¼XXô?ÔD.€Subparagraph€(c)(3)ò òÔ#†Xô?X¼¼ßwáº#ÔÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?ÔÐ 0 ¼ ÐÒܰǺÒÓÕºÓò òÌó óÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“<»#Ô(3)€to€prevent€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€a€person€[or€a€classÐ D"Ð Ðof€similarly€situated€persons]€if€the€lawyer€reasonably€believes,€after€reasonable€inquiry,Ïthat€there€is€a€significant€likelihood€that€such€injury€will€result€from€ÌÌÒ` ÜÒ(i)€future€conduct€of€the€client€[or€a€third€person]€that€the€lawyer€knows€òòò òisóó€ò òwillÐ ô%€ # Ðbeó óó ó€criminal€or€fraudulent;€or€€Ð ä&p!$ ÐÌÒÜ` ؼÒÒ` ÜÒ(ii)€past€conduct€of€the€client€[or€a€third€person]€that€the€lawyer€knowsò ò€òòisóó€ò òto€beó óó óÐ À(L#& Ðcriminal€or€fraudulent;€or€€€€ÌÒÜ` ¦½Òó óÌÒ°ÜÒÒ°ÜÒà  àFor€purposes€of€sharpening€the€focus€of€the€Commissionððs€consideration€of€theÏcircumstances€in€which€a€lawyer€should€be€permitted€to€reveal€information€relating€to€theÏrepresentation€of€a€client€if€disclosure€is€necessary€to€protect€the€financial€and€property€interests€ofÏthird€persons,€I€am€treating€loss€prevention€and€loss€mitigation€or€rectification€in€separateÏparagraphs.€€Loss€that€has€not€yet€occurred€can€be€prevented.€€Loss€that€has€already€occurred€canÐ 8/Ä)- Ðbe€mitigated€or€rectified.€If€a€loss€has€already€occurred€but€additional€loss€is€possible,€theÏadditional€loss€can€be€prevented,€but€the€loss€that€has€already€occurred€can€only€be€rectified€orÏmitigated.€€Paragraph€(c)(3)€deals€exclusively€with€the€prevention€of€losses€not€yet€suffered.€€€It€isÏdivided€into€two€parts€„€one€dealing€with€intended€frauds€or€crimes€about€which€the€lawyerÏacquires€information€prior€to€any€fraudulent€or€criminal€act€by€the€the€client€and€the€other€dealingÏwith€the€situation€in€which€the€lawyer€comes€to€know€that€the€client€has€previously€engaged€in€aÏfraudulent€act€but€no€loss€has€yet€been€suffered€by€the€intended€victim.€€An€example€of€the€latterÏsituation€would€be€when€a€lawyer€learns€that€a€client€has€lied€on€a€loan€application€but€the€bankÏhas€not€yet€issued€a€check€to€the€client.€€Paragraph€(c)(4),€on€the€other€hand,€addresses€theÏsituation€when€a€lawyer€comes€to€know€of€the€fraud€after€a€loss€has€been€suffered€by€a€victim.€ÏAlthough€several€jurisdictions€attempt€to€address€all€these€situations€in€a€single€rule,€I€amÏrecommending€that€they€be€treated€separately.€€€€ÌÌà  àThe€big€issue,€of€course,€is€whether€lawyers€should€ever€be€permitted€to€reveal€informationÏrelated€to€the€representation€of€a€client€for€the€purpose€of€preventing€substantial€loss€to€theÏfinancial€or€property€interests€of€a€third€person.€€Model€Rule€1.6€currently€answers€this€question€inÏthe€negative.€If€the€Commission€answers€this€question€affirmatively,€the€question€becomes€underÏwhat€circumstances€the€lawyer€should€be€permitted€to€do€so.€€If€the€Commission€answers€theÏquestion€in€the€negative,€I€will€propose€a€rule€that€specifically€permits€ð ðnoisy€withdrawal.ðð€€€BasedÏon€my€review€of€the€various€ways€in€which€these€questions€have€been€answered,€the€CommissionÏwill€need€to€address€and€resolve€the€following€issues:ÌÒܰb¾ÒÒ/ÜÒÌ1.€Should€disclosure€be€permitted€only€in€such€cases€in€which€the€loss€is€substantial€or€willÏany€loss€or€serious€loss€be€sufficient?€€What€if€€the€conduct€in€question€will€notÏsubstantially€or€seriously€injury€any€one€person,€but€will€cause€an€aggregate€substantialÏloss€on€a€class€or€similarly„situated€persons?€€€ÌÌ2.€Should€it€be€sufficient€that€the€lawyer€ð ðbelieveðð€the€loss€is€likely€to€be€suffered€or€shouldÏthe€lawyer€be€required€to€ð ðreasonably€believeðð€that€the€loss€will€be€suffered?€€Or,€for€thatÏmatter,€should€the€standard€be€ð ðsubstantial€reason€to€believe?ðð€How€certain€do€we€wantÏthe€lawyer€to€be€that€substantial€financial€€harm€will€be€suffered€by€the€victim.€Should€weÏrequire€the€lawyer€to€make€reasonable€inquiry€prior€to€deciding€the€disclosure€isÏpermissible?€€€ÌÌ3.€Should€permissive€disclosure€be€restricted€to€situations€in€which€the€client€will€beÏcommitting€or€aiding€and€abetting€the€crime€or€fraud€or€should€the€lawyer€be€able€to€useÏconfidential€information€to€prevent€a€crime€or€fraud€by€a€third€person?€ÌÌ4.€Should€permissive€disclosure€be€restricted€to€situations€in€which€the€clientððs€conductÏoccurred€while€the€lawyer€is€or€was€representing€the€client€or€(even€more€restrictively)€toÏsituations€in€which€the€client€has€used€the€lawyerððs€services€in€committing€the€crime€orÏfraud?ÌÌ5.€Should€the€lawyer€be€permitted€to€disclose€confidential€information€to€preventÏsubstantial€or€serious€injury€likely€to€result€from€any€tortious€or€intentionally€tortiousÏconduct€or€should€such€disclosure€be€limited€to€criminal€and€fraudulent€conduct?€€€Ð ð.|)- ÐÒÜÊÇÒÒܰp¾ÒÌÒ°ÜÒÒ°ÜÒà  àThere€is€no€counterpart€to€the€paragraph€(c)(3)€in€the€Model€Rules.€€By€way€ofÏbackground,€however,€it€is€important€to€note€that€the€original€proposal€of€the€Kutak€CommissionÏpermitted€disclosure€ð ðto€prevent€the€client€from€committing€a€criminal€or€fraudulent€act€that€theÏlawyer€reasonably€believes€is€likely€to€result€in€...€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€interests€orÏproperty€of€another.ðð€€€This€language€was€deleted€from€the€final€draft.€€Note€that€this€formulationÏrequires€a€ð ðreasonable€beliefðð€and€restricts€disclosure€to€situations€in€which€the€client€intends€toÏcommit€a€criminal€or€fraudulent€act€likely€to€result€in€ð ðsubstantialðð€injury,€but€€makes€no€referenceÏto€the€lawyerððs€involvement€in€the€client€proposed€conduct.€€€€€ÌÌà  à8€jurisdictions€have€adopted€the€Model€Rule€in€its€current€form€or€a€rule€that€similarlyÏdoes€not€permit€disclosure€to€prevent€crimes€and€frauds€if€the€only€resulting€injury€is€to€€theÏfinancial€or€property€€interests€of€the€victim.€€8€jurisdictions€permit€and€3€jurisdictions€requireÏdisclosure€in€circumstances€involving€crimes€and€non„criminal€frauds€that€are€likely€to€result€inÏsubstantial€injury€to€another€personððs€financial€or€property€interests€.€€None€of€these€jurisdictionsÏcondition€disclosure€upon€the€nature€of€the€lawyerððs€involvement€in€the€clientððs€conduct.€Of€thoseÏpermitting€disclosure,€7€do€so€if€the€lawyer€ð ðbelievesðð€the€injury€is€likely,€and€only€one€requiresÏthat€the€lawyer€ð ðreasonably€believeðð€the€injury€is€likely.€Two€of€the€three€jurisdictions€thatÏmandate€disclosure€require€that€the€lawyerððs€belief€be€reasonable.€€ÌÌà  à25€jurisdictions€permit€and€one€requires€a€lawyer€to€reveal€the€intention€of€their€client€toÏcommit€a€crime€without€regard€to€the€amount€of€injury€caused€the€intended€victim.€In€theseÏjurisdictions,€however,€a€lawyer€will€not€be€permitted€to€reveal€non„criminal€frauds€even€if€theÏfraud€was€likely€to€cause€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€another.€€23€ofÏthese€jurisdictions€use€the€Model€Code€formulation€which€does€not€clearly€indicate€whether€theÏlawyer€must€believe€or€reasonably€believe€that€the€client€intends€to€commit€the€crime.€€The€rulesÏof€two€jurisdictions€can€be€read€to€require€that€the€lawyer€have€a€reasonable€belief€that€the€clientÏwill€commit€the€crime.€€€Nevada€has€taken€a€unique€track€in€that€it€permits€disclosure€to€the€extentÏreasonably€necessary€to€ð ðprevent€...€the€consequences€of€a€criminal€or€fraudulent€act€in€theÏcommission€of€which€the€lawyerððs€services€have€been€used.ðð€€Note€that€the€rule€stands€aloneÏbecause€it€permits€disclosure€of€fraudulent€acts€without€regard€to€the€amount€of€injury€caused€byÏthe€fraud.€€It€also€stands€alone€in€that€disclosure€is€limited€to€client€crimes€and€frauds€in€theÏcommission€of€which€the€lawyerððs€services€have€been€used.€ÌÌà  àYet€another€source€of€variation€among€the€states€arises€from€the€fact€the€ABA€ModelÏCodeððs€DR€7„102(b)(1)€is€still€in€force€in€a€handful€of€jurisdictions.€€In€pertinent€part€it€providesÏthat€[a]€lawyer€who€receives€information€that€...[h]is€client€has,€in€the€course€of€the€representation,Ïperpetrated€a€fraud€upon€a€person€...€shall€reveal€the€fraud€to€the€affected€person...,€except€whenÏthe€information€is€protected€as€a€privileged€communication.ðð€€Applying€this€rule€to€the€situation€inÏwhich€a€lawyer€learns€that€a€client€has€committed€a€fraudulent€act€during€the€lawyerððsÏrepresentation€of€the€client,€but€no€loss€has€yet€been€suffered€by€the€victim€because€the€deal€hasÏnot€been€closed€and€no€money€has€yet€changed€hands,€one€reasonable€interpretation€of€this€ruleÏleads€to€a€conclusion€that€disclosure€is€prohibited.€€An€equally€reasonable€„€although€moreÏcomplicated€„€interpretation€leads€to€the€conclusion€that€disclosure€is€required.€€Let€it€suffice€forÏthe€moment€to€say€that€our€goal€should€be€to€provide€better€guidance€to€the€bar€about€theirÏresponsibilities€when€they€become€entangled€in€a€clientððs€ongoing€effort€to€commit€a€crime€orÐ ð.|)- Ðfraud.€€ÌÌà  àTÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôhe€most€recent€draft€of€ðð117(B)(1)€of€the€ALI€Restatement€provides€in€pertinent€part:€Ð LØ ÐÒܰaÎÒÒܰSÎÒÌÒ°ÜÒÒÜÒð ð€A€lawyer€may...€disclose€confidential€client€information€when€and€to€the€extent€theÏlawyer€reasonably€believes€necessary€to€prevent€a€crime€or€fraud;€and:ÌÒܰ?ßÒÒ°ÜÒÒÜMßÒÒ` ÜÒÌ(a)€the€crime€or€fraud€threatens€substantial€loss€to€a€person;ÌÌ(b)€the€loss€has€not€yet€occurred;€ÌÌ(c)€the€lawyerððs€client€intends€to€commit€the€crime€or€fraud€either€directly€orÏthrough€a€third€person;€andÌÌ(d)€the€client€has€employed€or€is€employing€the€lawyerððs€services€in€committing€theÏcrime€or€fraud.ðð€ÌÒÜ` -àÒÒܰ àÒÒ°ÜÒÒ°ÜÒà  à¹Òܰ¯áÒÒ°ÜÒà  àA€prior€version€of€this€Rule€that€was€included€in€the€Proposed€Final€Draft€No.1€of€theÏRestatement,€but€was€not€approved€by€the€ALI,€provided€in€pertinent€part€that€ÌÌÒܰÜáÒÒÜÒð ð(1)€A€lawyer€may€...€disclose€confidential€client€information€when€and€to€the€extentÏnecessary€to€prevent€...€substantial€financial€loss€from€occurring€as€the€result€of€a€crime€orÏfraud€that€the€client€has€committed€or€intends€to€commit€[and€in€the€commission€of€whichÏthe€lawyerððs€services€were€or€are€being€employed].ÌÌ(2)€In€a€situation€described€in€Subsection€(1),€if€the€client€has€acted€at€the€time€the€lawyerÏlearns€of€the€threat€of€an€injury€or€loss€to€a€victim,€use€or€disclosure€is€permissible€only€ifÏthe€injury€or€loss€has€not€yet€occurred.ððÌÌÒܯâÒÒ°ÜÒà  àThere€was€such€considerable€disagreement€about€whether€the€bracketed€language€shouldÏbe€included€in€the€rule€that€the€Chief€Reporter€thought€the€disagreement€should€be€specificallyÏnoted€in€the€Proposed€Final€Draft.€€As€explained€by€the€Chief€Reporter,€the€version€which€did€notÏlimit€disclosure€to€situations€in€which€the€client€was€using€or€had€used€the€lawyerððs€services€toÏcommit€the€crime€or€fraud€was€premised€on€ð ða€balance€between€protecting€interests€in€clientÏconfidentiality€and€protecting€the€interests€of€society€and€third€persons€against€known€clientÏwrongs.€€The€more€limited€version€of€the€exception€was€premised€ð ðon€concepts€of€waiver€„¼reflecting€the€judgment€that€the€clientððs€wrongful€abuse€of€the€client„lawyer€relationship€and€theÏconsequent€threat€of€implicating€the€innocent€lawyer€are€both€necessary,€together€with€socialÏinterest€in€preventing€harm,€to€warrant€setting€aside€the€general€rule€of€confidentiality€in€the€caseÏof€financial€harm.ðð€€€ÌÒܰåÒÒ°fTÜÒ€€€€ÌÓ  ÓÔ‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ô1.€The€Core€Proposal€à @¸ àÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“-é#ÔÐ @+Ì%) ÐÓ!éÓÌà  àTo€facilitate€a€comparison€of€proposed€paragraph€(c)(3)€with€these€various€alternatives,€IÏrecommend€that€the€Commission€focus€first€on€what€I€will€call€the€core€proposal.€€The€coreÏproposal€reads€as€follows:Ð /Œ)- ÐÒܰ éÒÒ~PÜÒÌÔ#†Xô?XXXô?Þ#Ôò ò(3)€to€prevent€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€a€person€if€theÐ `ì Ðlawyer€reasonably€believes,€after€reasonable€inquiry,€that€there€is€a€significant€likelihoodÏthat€such€injury€will€result€from€ÌÌÒܹêÒÒ` ÜÒ(i)€future€conduct€of€the€client€that€the€lawyer€knows€òòò òisóó€ò òwill€beó óó ó€criminal€orÐ  œ Ðfraudulent;€or€€ÌÌÒÜ` õëÒÒ` ÜÒ(ii)€past€conduct€of€the€client€that€the€lawyer€knowsò ò€òòisóó€ò òto€beó óó ó€criminal€or€fraudulent;Ð Ø d Ðor€€€€ÌÒÜ` ›ìÒó óÒ` ÜÒ€€€€Ô‡Š²“ ŠXXô?Ôò òò òÐ ´@  ÐÒÜ` BíÒó óó óÔ#†Xô?X ŠŠ²“Tí#ÔÒ°ÜÒÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôà  àThe€core€proposal€is€similar€to€both€the€Kutak€Commissionððs€proposal€and€ðð117B€of€theÐ  ,  ÐRestatement€of€the€Law€Governing€LawyersÔ#†Xô?XXXô?×í#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ô€in€that€it€permits€disclosure€reasonably€necessary€toÐ Œ  Ðprevent€substantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€a€person€that€the€lawyerÏreasonably€believes€is€likely€to€result€from€a€criminal€or€fraudulent€act€of€the€client.€€To€that€extentÏit€differs€both€from€the€current€Model€Rule€(which€does€not€permit€disclosure€to€prevent€injury€toÏfinancial€or€property€interests)€and€the€ABA€Model€Code€(which€permits€disclosure€to€prevent€theÏcommission€of€any€crime€without€regard€to€injury€suffered€by€the€victim,€but€does€not€permitÏdisclosure€to€prevent€the€perpetration€of€a€non„criminal€fraud€even€if€such€fraud€is€sure€to€result€inÏsubstantial€injury€to€the€financial€or€property€interests€of€another.)€€ÌÌà  àThere€is€one€respect€in€which€the€core€proposal€differs€from€both€the€Kutak€CommissionððsÏproposal€and€ðð117B€of€the€Restatement€of€the€Law€Governing€Lawyers€and€another€respect€inÏwhich€the€core€proposal€tracks€the€Kutak€Commissionððs€proposal€but€differs€from€€ðð117B.€€€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?½î#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?ÔTheÐ °< Ðfirst€difference€is€that€the€core€proposal€Ô#†Xô?XXXô?ó#ÔÔ‡Xô?XXXô?Ôemphasizes€loss€prevention€rather€than€the€prevention€ofÐ œ( Ðcriminal€or€fraudulent€acts.€€Both€the€Kutak€Commissionð